Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Mind in a Physical World' and 'Rules for the Direction of the Mind'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
One truth leads us to another [Descartes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes]
Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes]
We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim]
Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim]
Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]