18 ideas
13331 | Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K] |
15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
13332 | Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K] |
15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
13333 | The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K] |
13326 | A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K] |
13327 | A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K] |
13329 | An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K] |
13330 | An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K] |
13328 | Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K] |
15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |