Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Philosophical Logic' and 'On the Heavens'

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42 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess]
It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic
Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess]
The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess]
Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 6. Sequent Calculi
The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess]
We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess]
We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess]
We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess]
Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess]
It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle]
There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle]
The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]