Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Reference and Definite Descriptions' and 'works'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
21489 Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
19095 Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak]
19097 Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]
21494 If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
21493 Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
19102 Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
7760 Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
5811 A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
5812 Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
5814 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
10352 The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13498 Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
21491 Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16376 The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
19107 Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
10435 A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury]
10451 Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan]
5813 A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
5815 Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]