29 ideas
10143 | 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K] |
9143 | Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10145 | Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K] |
10136 | Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K] |
10144 | Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K] |
1350 | Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid] |
21322 | We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid] |
21320 | Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid] |
1367 | Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid] |
23644 | Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid] |
23643 | We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid] |
1356 | A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid] |
1359 | Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid] |
21319 | I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid] |
21323 | The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid] |
21321 | Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid] |
21324 | If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid] |
21325 | Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid] |
21327 | If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid] |
1366 | If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid] |
1352 | Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid] |
9144 | Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10141 | Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K] |
10135 | We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K] |
9142 | Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10137 | Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K] |
10138 | An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |