102 ideas
| 2512 | Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein] |
| 4148 | What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein] |
| 22490 | Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein] |
| 16325 | Analysis rests on natural language, but its ideal is a framework which revises language [Halbach] |
| 6566 | The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein] |
| 16292 | An explicit definition enables the elimination of what is defined [Halbach] |
| 16307 | Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach] |
| 16330 | Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach] |
| 16339 | Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach] |
| 16324 | Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 16293 | Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach] |
| 16301 | If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach] |
| 16297 | Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach] |
| 16337 | Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach] |
| 16322 | CT proves PA consistent, which PA can't do on its own, so CT is not conservative over PA [Halbach] |
| 16294 | Axiomatic truth doesn't presuppose a truth-definition, though it could admit it at a later stage [Halbach] |
| 16326 | The main semantic theories of truth are Kripke's theory, and revisions semantics [Halbach] |
| 16311 | To axiomatise Tarski's truth definition, we need a binary predicate for his 'satisfaction' [Halbach] |
| 16318 | Compositional Truth CT has the truth of a sentence depending of the semantic values of its constituents [Halbach] |
| 16299 | Gödel numbering means a theory of truth can use Peano Arithmetic as its base theory [Halbach] |
| 16340 | Truth axioms need a base theory, because that is where truth issues arise [Halbach] |
| 16305 | We know a complete axiomatisation of truth is not feasible [Halbach] |
| 16313 | A theory is 'conservative' if it adds no new theorems to its base theory [Halbach, by PG] |
| 16315 | The Tarski Biconditional theory TB is Peano Arithmetic, plus truth, plus all Tarski bi-conditionals [Halbach] |
| 16314 | Theories of truth are 'typed' (truth can't apply to sentences containing 'true'), or 'type-free' [Halbach] |
| 16327 | Friedman-Sheard is type-free Compositional Truth, with two inference rules for truth [Halbach] |
| 16329 | Kripke-Feferman theory KF axiomatises Kripke fixed-points, with Strong Kleene logic with gluts [Halbach] |
| 16332 | The KF theory is useful, but it is not a theory containing its own truth predicate [Halbach] |
| 16331 | The KF is much stronger deductively than FS, which relies on classical truth [Halbach] |
| 16319 | Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach] |
| 16320 | Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach] |
| 16338 | Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach] |
| 16317 | The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach] |
| 16316 | Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach] |
| 16335 | In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction just needs one disjunct to be true [Halbach] |
| 16334 | In Weak Kleene logic there are 'gaps', neither true nor false if one component lacks a truth value [Halbach] |
| 16309 | Every attempt at formal rigour uses some set theory [Halbach] |
| 16333 | The underestimated costs of giving up classical logic are found in mathematical reasoning [Halbach] |
| 18743 | Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 16310 | A theory is some formulae and all of their consequences [Halbach] |
| 4139 | Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein] |
| 4946 | A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke] |
| 16342 | You cannot just say all of Peano arithmetic is true, as 'true' isn't part of the system [Halbach] |
| 16341 | Normally we only endorse a theory if we believe it to be sound [Halbach] |
| 16344 | Soundness must involve truth; the soundness of PA certainly needs it [Halbach] |
| 16347 | Many new paradoxes may await us when we study interactions between frameworks [Halbach] |
| 16336 | The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach] |
| 16321 | The compactness theorem can prove nonstandard models of PA [Halbach] |
| 16343 | The global reflection principle seems to express the soundness of Peano Arithmetic [Halbach] |
| 16312 | To reduce PA to ZF, we represent the non-negative integers with von Neumann ordinals [Halbach] |
| 16308 | Set theory was liberated early from types, and recent truth-theories are exploring type-free [Halbach] |
| 16345 | That Peano arithmetic is interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by philosophers as a reduction [Halbach] |
| 15106 | Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein] |
| 16346 | Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth [Halbach] |
| 6600 | The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein] |
| 4153 | Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein] |
| 6501 | As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H] |
| 11079 | How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein] |
| 4160 | One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
| 19273 | I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein] |
| 5663 | It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein] |
| 19272 | To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein] |
| 4161 | If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein] |
| 7392 | If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein] |
| 5676 | To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein] |
| 4154 | Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein] |
| 4158 | An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein] |
| 6165 | Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein] |
| 4143 | One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein] |
| 7092 | If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein] |
| 4138 | Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein] |
| 7055 | Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil] |
| 12576 | Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke] |
| 4157 | Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein] |
| 12606 | Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein] |
| 4141 | Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein] |
| 23450 | Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 4150 | Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein] |
| 6567 | For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 6169 | We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands] |
| 4155 | We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein] |
| 4137 | In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein] |
| 4142 | To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein] |
| 4149 | We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein] |
| 4156 | Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein] |
| 4145 | How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein] |
| 4140 | The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein] |
| 16298 | We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach] |
| 6166 | Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein] |
| 7875 | If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein] |
| 4146 | We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein] |
| 4147 | If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein] |
| 5659 | If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton] |
| 4152 | Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein] |
| 4136 | To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein] |
| 4144 | Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein] |
| 11049 | To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein] |
| 6658 | What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm? [Wittgenstein] |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| 4151 | Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein] |
| 4159 | The human body is the best picture of the human soul [Wittgenstein] |