38 ideas
10354 | Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch] |
10353 | Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch] |
7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
10337 | We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch] |
10357 | Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch] |
10339 | Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch] |
10331 | Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch] |
10338 | The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch] |
10340 | Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch] |
10345 | Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch] |
10350 | Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch] |
10343 | Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch] |
10341 | Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch] |
10334 | Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch] |
10336 | Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch] |
10324 | Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch] |
10327 | Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch] |
10329 | Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch] |
10330 | A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch] |
10325 | Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch] |
10335 | Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch] |
10323 | Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch] |
10348 | Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch] |
10349 | To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch] |
10344 | Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch] |
10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
10358 | Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch] |
10333 | Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
10351 | Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
10332 | Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch] |