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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Troubles with Functionalism' and 'Nature Without Essence'

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27 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
17867 If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds [Almog]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
17877 The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17872 Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog]
17871 Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog]
17866 Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog]
17868 Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17870 Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
17869 Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
17876 Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
2584 Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
2582 A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2574 Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2576 In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
2575 Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
2583 You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
2578 Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block]
2585 Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block]
2586 In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2579 Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
2577 Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block]
2580 A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
17873 Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
2581 Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
17864 Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog]
17863 Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]