65 ideas
| 5333 | Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be [Flanagan] |
| 5334 | We resist science partly because it can't provide ethical wisdom [Flanagan] |
| 24084 | Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche] |
| 24092 | I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive [Nietzsche] |
| 24114 | The pain in truth is when it destroys a belief [Nietzsche] |
| 24104 | We don't create logic, time and space! The mind obeys laws because they are true [Nietzsche] |
| 24112 | To think about being we must have an opinion about what it is [Nietzsche] |
| 24089 | Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche] |
| 24115 | There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall [Nietzsche] |
| 5340 | Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan] |
| 5346 | In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan] |
| 24090 | Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity [Nietzsche] |
| 5341 | Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan] |
| 5351 | We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan] |
| 5353 | The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan] |
| 5354 | We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan] |
| 24099 | We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind [Nietzsche] |
| 5349 | For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan] |
| 5338 | Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan] |
| 5344 | Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan] |
| 5332 | People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan] |
| 5345 | We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan] |
| 5343 | People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan] |
| 5347 | Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan] |
| 5339 | Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan] |
| 5342 | Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan] |
| 24102 | Thoughts are signs (just as words are) [Nietzsche] |
| 5335 | Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle [Flanagan] |
| 24120 | Great orators lead their arguments, rather than following them [Nietzsche] |
| 24097 | The pragmatics of language is more comprehensible than the meaning [Nietzsche] |
| 24108 | Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche] |
| 24105 | Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings [Nietzsche] |
| 24117 | We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche] |
| 24113 | Our motives don't explain our actions [Nietzsche] |
| 5348 | Intellectualism admires the 'principled actor', non-intellectualism admires the 'good character' [Flanagan] |
| 24087 | People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty' [Nietzsche] |
| 24091 | The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation [Nietzsche] |
| 5355 | Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason [Flanagan] |
| 24093 | We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves [Nietzsche] |
| 24121 | Greeks might see modern analysis of what is human as impious [Nietzsche] |
| 24107 | Once a drive controls the intellect, it rules, and sets the goals [Nietzsche] |
| 24085 | For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche] |
| 24101 | We always assign values, but we may not value those values [Nietzsche] |
| 5336 | Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan] |
| 24094 | Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones [Nietzsche] |
| 24111 | Happiness is the active equilibrium of our drives [Nietzsche] |
| 24109 | Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche] |
| 24110 | Some things we would never do, even for the highest ideals [Nietzsche] |
| 24103 | You should not want too many virtues; one is enough [Nietzsche] |
| 24106 | Talk of 'utility' presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined [Nietzsche] |
| 24086 | The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable [Nietzsche] |
| 24123 | My eternal recurrence is opposed to feeling fragmented and imperfect [Nietzsche] |
| 24088 | See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life [Nietzsche] |
| 24119 | The eternal return of wastefulness is a terrible thought [Nietzsche] |
| 24116 | Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal [Nietzsche] |
| 24098 | Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime [Nietzsche] |
| 24118 | Do away with punishment. Counter-retribution is as bad as the crime [Nietzsche] |
| 24100 | If you don't want war, remove your borders; but you set up borders because you want war [Nietzsche] |
| 24095 | Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp [Nietzsche] |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 24096 | Unlike time, space is subjective. Empty space was assumed, but it doesn't exist [Nietzsche] |
| 24122 | Life is forces conjoined by nutrition, to produce resistance, arrangement and value [Nietzsche] |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| 5350 | The Hindu doctrine of reincarnation only appeared in the eighth century CE [Flanagan] |
| 5352 | The idea of the soul gets some support from the scientific belief in essential 'natural kinds' [Flanagan] |