138 ideas
14122 | Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth [Russell] |
14109 | The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell] |
14165 | Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum [Russell] |
14115 | Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell] |
14159 | In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell] |
14148 | Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell] |
18002 | As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables [Russell] |
14102 | What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions' [Russell] |
14176 | "The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell] |
14113 | The null class is a fiction [Russell] |
10073 | There cannot be a set theory which is complete [Smith,P] |
15894 | Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor [Russell, by Lavine] |
14126 | Order rests on 'between' and 'separation' [Russell] |
14127 | Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations [Russell] |
14121 | The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable [Russell] |
10616 | Second-order arithmetic can prove new sentences of first-order [Smith,P] |
14108 | It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell] |
14106 | Implication cannot be defined [Russell] |
14167 | The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell] |
14105 | There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell] |
18722 | Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
14104 | Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell] |
14114 | Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell] |
10075 | A 'partial function' maps only some elements to another set [Smith,P] |
10074 | A 'total function' maps every element to one element in another set [Smith,P] |
10612 | An argument is a 'fixed point' for a function if it is mapped back to itself [Smith,P] |
10076 | The 'range' of a function is the set of elements in the output set created by the function [Smith,P] |
10605 | Two functions are the same if they have the same extension [Smith,P] |
10615 | The Comprehension Schema says there is a property only had by things satisfying a condition [Smith,P] |
10595 | A 'theorem' of a theory is a sentence derived from the axioms using the proof system [Smith,P] |
14137 | 'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell] |
10602 | A 'natural deduction system' has no axioms but many rules [Smith,P] |
10613 | No nice theory can define truth for its own language [Smith,P] |
10078 | An 'injective' ('one-to-one') function creates a distinct output element from each original [Smith,P] |
10077 | A 'surjective' ('onto') function creates every element of the output set [Smith,P] |
10079 | A 'bijective' function has one-to-one correspondence in both directions [Smith,P] |
10070 | If everything that a theory proves is true, then it is 'sound' [Smith,P] |
10086 | Soundness is true axioms and a truth-preserving proof system [Smith,P] |
10596 | A theory is 'sound' iff every theorem is true (usually from true axioms and truth-preservation) [Smith,P] |
10598 | A theory is 'negation complete' if it proves all sentences or their negation [Smith,P] |
10597 | 'Complete' applies both to whole logics, and to theories within them [Smith,P] |
10069 | A theory is 'negation complete' if one of its sentences or its negation can always be proved [Smith,P] |
10609 | Two routes to Incompleteness: semantics of sound/expressible, or syntax of consistency/proof [Smith,P] |
10080 | 'Effective' means simple, unintuitive, independent, controlled, dumb, and terminating [Smith,P] |
10087 | A theory is 'decidable' if all of its sentences could be mechanically proved [Smith,P] |
10088 | Any consistent, axiomatized, negation-complete formal theory is decidable [Smith,P] |
10081 | A set is 'enumerable' is all of its elements can result from a natural number function [Smith,P] |
10083 | A set is 'effectively enumerable' if a computer could eventually list every member [Smith,P] |
10084 | A finite set of finitely specifiable objects is always effectively enumerable (e.g. primes) [Smith,P] |
10085 | The set of ordered pairs of natural numbers <i,j> is effectively enumerable [Smith,P] |
10601 | The thorems of a nice arithmetic can be enumerated, but not the truths (so they're diffferent) [Smith,P] |
10600 | Being 'expressible' depends on language; being 'capture/represented' depends on axioms and proof system [Smith,P] |
14149 | The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell] |
15895 | Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine] |
14152 | In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses [Russell] |
14154 | Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space [Russell] |
14151 | Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists [Russell] |
14153 | In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience [Russell] |
14155 | Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective) [Russell, by PG] |
10599 | For primes we write (x not= 1 ∧ ∀u∀v(u x v = x → (u = 1 ∨ v = 1))) [Smith,P] |
18254 | Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8 [Russell, by Dummett] |
14144 | Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes [Russell] |
14128 | Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them [Russell] |
14129 | Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one [Russell] |
14132 | Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic [Russell] |
14141 | Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction [Russell] |
14142 | Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance [Russell] |
14139 | Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic [Russell] |
14145 | For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers [Russell] |
14146 | We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another [Russell] |
14135 | Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all) [Russell] |
10610 | The reals contain the naturals, but the theory of reals doesn't contain the theory of naturals [Smith,P] |
14123 | Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable [Russell] |
14158 | Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order [Russell] |
14120 | Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic [Russell] |
14118 | We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity [Russell] |
10619 | The truths of arithmetic are just true equations and their universally quantified versions [Smith,P] |
14119 | We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other [Russell] |
14133 | There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal) [Russell] |
14134 | Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole [Russell] |
14143 | ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers [Russell] |
14138 | You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it [Russell] |
14140 | For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals [Russell] |
14124 | Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater [Russell] |
10618 | All numbers are related to zero by the ancestral of the successor relation [Smith,P] |
10608 | The number of Fs is the 'successor' of the Gs if there is a single F that isn't G [Smith,P] |
10849 | Baby arithmetic covers addition and multiplication, but no general facts about numbers [Smith,P] |
10850 | Baby Arithmetic is complete, but not very expressive [Smith,P] |
10852 | Robinson Arithmetic (Q) is not negation complete [Smith,P] |
10851 | Robinson Arithmetic 'Q' has basic axioms, quantifiers and first-order logic [Smith,P] |
7530 | Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class' [Russell, by Monk] |
18246 | Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions [Shapiro on Russell] |
10068 | Natural numbers have zero, unique successors, unending, no circling back, and no strays [Smith,P] |
14147 | Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite [Russell] |
10603 | The logic of arithmetic must quantify over properties of numbers to handle induction [Smith,P] |
14125 | Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction [Russell] |
10848 | Multiplication only generates incompleteness if combined with addition and successor [Smith,P] |
10604 | Incompleteness results in arithmetic from combining addition and successor with multiplication [Smith,P] |
14116 | Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and + [Russell] |
14117 | Numbers are properties of classes [Russell] |
9977 | Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities [Russell] |
14162 | Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist [Russell] |
14103 | Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q' [Russell] |
21555 | For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x [Russell] |
18003 | In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless [Russell, by Magidor] |
11010 | Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought [Russell] |
14161 | Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell] |
14173 | What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell] |
14163 | Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points [Russell] |
21341 | Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil] |
10586 | 'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness [Russell] |
10585 | Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality [Russell] |
10617 | The 'ancestral' of a relation is a new relation which creates a long chain of the original relation [Smith,P] |
7781 | I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell] |
14166 | Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell] |
14164 | The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell] |
14112 | A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell] |
14170 | Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell] |
14107 | Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell] |
11849 | It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
22303 | It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell] |
10583 | Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation [Russell] |
10582 | The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity [Russell] |
10584 | A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation [Russell] |
14110 | Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell] |
19164 | If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell] |
14111 | A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell] |
19157 | Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
14175 | We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts [Russell] |
14172 | Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them [Russell] |
14174 | The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter [Russell] |
14168 | Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times [Russell] |
14171 | Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction [Russell] |
14160 | Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry [Russell] |
14156 | Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line [Russell] |
14169 | The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist [Russell] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |