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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Intro to Gdel's Theorems' and 'Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue'

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75 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
There cannot be a set theory which is complete [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order arithmetic can prove new sentences of first-order [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
A 'partial function' maps only some elements to another set [Smith,P]
A 'total function' maps every element to one element in another set [Smith,P]
An argument is a 'fixed point' for a function if it is mapped back to itself [Smith,P]
The 'range' of a function is the set of elements in the output set created by the function [Smith,P]
Two functions are the same if they have the same extension [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
The Comprehension Schema says there is a property only had by things satisfying a condition [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A 'theorem' of a theory is a sentence derived from the axioms using the proof system [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
A 'natural deduction system' has no axioms but many rules [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
No nice theory can define truth for its own language [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
An 'injective' ('one-to-one') function creates a distinct output element from each original [Smith,P]
A 'surjective' ('onto') function creates every element of the output set [Smith,P]
A 'bijective' function has one-to-one correspondence in both directions [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
If everything that a theory proves is true, then it is 'sound' [Smith,P]
Soundness is true axioms and a truth-preserving proof system [Smith,P]
A theory is 'sound' iff every theorem is true (usually from true axioms and truth-preservation) [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A theory is 'negation complete' if it proves all sentences or their negation [Smith,P]
'Complete' applies both to whole logics, and to theories within them [Smith,P]
A theory is 'negation complete' if one of its sentences or its negation can always be proved [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
Two routes to Incompleteness: semantics of sound/expressible, or syntax of consistency/proof [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
'Effective' means simple, unintuitive, independent, controlled, dumb, and terminating [Smith,P]
A theory is 'decidable' if all of its sentences could be mechanically proved [Smith,P]
Any consistent, axiomatized, negation-complete formal theory is decidable [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
A set is 'enumerable' is all of its elements can result from a natural number function [Smith,P]
A set is 'effectively enumerable' if a computer could eventually list every member [Smith,P]
A finite set of finitely specifiable objects is always effectively enumerable (e.g. primes) [Smith,P]
The set of ordered pairs of natural numbers <i,j> is effectively enumerable [Smith,P]
The thorems of a nice arithmetic can be enumerated, but not the truths (so they're diffferent) [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 9. Expressibility
Being 'expressible' depends on language; being 'capture/represented' depends on axioms and proof system [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
For primes we write (x not= 1 ∧ ∀u∀v(u x v = x → (u = 1 ∨ v = 1))) [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
The reals contain the naturals, but the theory of reals doesn't contain the theory of naturals [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
The truths of arithmetic are just true equations and their universally quantified versions [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
All numbers are related to zero by the ancestral of the successor relation [Smith,P]
The number of Fs is the 'successor' of the Gs if there is a single F that isn't G [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / b. Baby arithmetic
Baby arithmetic covers addition and multiplication, but no general facts about numbers [Smith,P]
Baby Arithmetic is complete, but not very expressive [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / c. Robinson arithmetic
Robinson Arithmetic (Q) is not negation complete [Smith,P]
Robinson Arithmetic 'Q' has basic axioms, quantifiers and first-order logic [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Natural numbers have zero, unique successors, unending, no circling back, and no strays [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
The logic of arithmetic must quantify over properties of numbers to handle induction [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Multiplication only generates incompleteness if combined with addition and successor [Smith,P]
Incompleteness results in arithmetic from combining addition and successor with multiplication [Smith,P]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
The 'ancestral' of a relation is a new relation which creates a long chain of the original relation [Smith,P]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant]
All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant]
Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant]
The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant]
If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant]
Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant]
Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant]
Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant]
Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant]
We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant]
Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant]
Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]