90 ideas
7490 | Because of Darwin, wisdom as a definite attainable state has faded [Watson] |
7461 | The three key ideas are the soul, Europe, and the experiment [Watson] |
7464 | The big idea: imitation, the soul, experiments, God, heliocentric universe, evolution? [Watson] |
16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber] |
9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford] |
8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe] |
16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe] |
8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
7465 | Babylonian thinking used analogy, rather than deduction or induction [Watson] |
8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe] |
8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe] |
7466 | Mesopotamian numbers applied to specific things, and then became abstract [Watson] |
8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe] |
8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe] |
8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe] |
8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe] |
8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe] |
8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe] |
8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe] |
8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe] |
8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe] |
8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe] |
8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe] |
8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe] |
8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe] |
8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe] |
8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe] |
8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe] |
8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe] |
8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe] |
8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe] |
8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe] |
13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff] |
8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe] |
8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe] |
8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe] |
8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe] |
8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe] |
8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe] |
8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe] |
8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe] |
8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe] |
8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe] |
8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe] |
8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe] |
16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe] |
8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe] |
8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe] |
8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe] |
8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe] |
16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow] |
8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe] |
16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe] |
8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe] |
8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe] |
8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe] |
8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe] |
8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe] |
8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe] |
7477 | Modern democracy is actually elective oligarchy [Watson] |
7478 | Greek philosophers invented the concept of 'nature' as their special subject [Watson] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe] |
8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
7462 | DNA mutation suggests humans and chimpanzees diverged 6.6 million years ago [Watson] |
7470 | During the rise of civilizations, the main gods changed from female to male [Watson] |
7474 | Hinduism has no founder, or prophet, or creed, or ecclesiastical structure [Watson] |
7480 | Monotheism was a uniquely Israelite creation within the Middle East [Watson] |
7479 | Modern Judaism became stabilised in 200 CE [Watson] |
7481 | The Israelites may have asserted the uniqueness of Yahweh to justify land claims [Watson] |
7471 | The Gathas (hymns) of Zoroastrianism date from about 1000 BCE [Watson] |
7473 | Zoroaster conceived the afterlife, judgement, heaven and hell, and the devil [Watson] |
7484 | Jesus never intended to start a new religion [Watson] |
7483 | Paul's early writings mention few striking episodes from Jesus' life [Watson] |
7475 | Confucius revered the spiritual world, but not the supernatural, or a personal god, or the afterlife [Watson] |
7476 | Taoism aims at freedom from the world, the body, the mind, and nature [Watson] |
7463 | The three basic ingredients of religion are: the soul, seers or priests, and ritual [Watson] |
7468 | In ancient Athens the souls of the dead are received by the 'upper air' [Watson] |