37 ideas
| 12330 | In ontology, logic dominated language, until logic was mathematized [Badiou] |
| 12318 | The female body, when taken in its entirety, is the Phallus itself [Badiou] |
| 12325 | Philosophy has been relieved of physics, cosmology, politics, and now must give up ontology [Badiou] |
| 12324 | Consensus is the enemy of thought [Badiou] |
| 12337 | There is 'transivity' iff membership ∈ also means inclusion ⊆ [Badiou] |
| 12321 | The axiom of choice must accept an indeterminate, indefinable, unconstructible set [Badiou] |
| 12342 | Topos theory explains the plurality of possible logics [Badiou] |
| 12341 | Logic is a mathematical account of a universe of relations [Badiou] |
| 16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
| 12335 | Numbers are for measuring and for calculating (and the two must be consistent) [Badiou] |
| 12334 | There is no single unified definition of number [Badiou] |
| 12333 | Each type of number has its own characteristic procedure of introduction [Badiou] |
| 12322 | Must we accept numbers as existing when they no longer consist of units? [Badiou] |
| 12327 | The undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis may have ruined or fragmented set theory [Badiou] |
| 12329 | If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it [Badiou] |
| 12328 | Platonists like axioms and decisions, Aristotelians like definitions, possibilities and logic [Badiou] |
| 12331 | Logic is definitional, but real mathematics is axiomatic [Badiou] |
| 12340 | There is no Being as a whole, because there is no set of all sets [Badiou] |
| 12323 | Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou] |
| 12332 | The modern view of Being comes when we reject numbers as merely successions of One [Badiou] |
| 12326 | The primitive name of Being is the empty set; in a sense, only the empty set 'is' [Badiou] |
| 12320 | Ontology is (and always has been) Cantorian mathematics [Badiou] |
| 16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
| 16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
| 16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
| 16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
| 16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
| 16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
| 16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
| 16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
| 16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
| 16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
| 12338 | We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject [Badiou] |
| 12316 | For Enlightenment philosophers, God was no longer involved in politics [Badiou] |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| 12317 | The God of religion results from an encounter, not from a proof [Badiou] |