Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Rationality and Logic' and 'Intro to 'Modality and Tense''

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna]
'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna]
We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna]
Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K]
Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna]
Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna]
Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna]
One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna]
Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna]
Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna]
Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]