Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Animal Rights and Wrongs' and 'Philosophy of Logic'

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60 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject [Quine]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)' [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes]
Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine]
Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine]
There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine]
We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton]
Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton]
Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton]
Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton]
Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton]
Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton]
Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton]
An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton]
I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton]
Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton]
We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton]
Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton]
Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton]
Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton]
Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton]
Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton]
Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]