85 ideas
2512 | Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein] |
4148 | What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein] |
22490 | Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein] |
6566 | The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein] |
18743 | Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
4139 | Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein] |
4946 | A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke] |
15106 | Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein] |
6600 | The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein] |
4153 | Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein] |
6501 | As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H] |
11079 | How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein] |
4160 | One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
19273 | I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein] |
5663 | It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein] |
19272 | To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein] |
4161 | If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein] |
7392 | If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein] |
4363 | The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being? [Hursthouse] |
5676 | To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein] |
4154 | Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein] |
4158 | An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein] |
6165 | Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein] |
4143 | One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein] |
7092 | If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein] |
4138 | Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein] |
7055 | Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil] |
12576 | Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke] |
4157 | Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein] |
12606 | Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein] |
4141 | Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein] |
23450 | Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
4150 | Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein] |
6567 | For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
6169 | We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands] |
4155 | We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein] |
4137 | In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein] |
4142 | To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein] |
4149 | We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein] |
4156 | Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein] |
4145 | How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein] |
4140 | The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein] |
6166 | Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein] |
7875 | If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein] |
4146 | We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein] |
4147 | If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein] |
5659 | If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton] |
4152 | Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein] |
4136 | To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein] |
4144 | Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein] |
11049 | To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein] |
6658 | What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm? [Wittgenstein] |
4355 | There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse] |
4325 | Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient? [Hursthouse] |
4351 | It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous [Hursthouse] |
4340 | You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest [Hursthouse] |
4329 | After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret [Hursthouse] |
4330 | Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent [Hursthouse] |
4341 | Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life [Hursthouse] |
4358 | Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
4337 | Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse] |
4324 | Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
4359 | When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet [Hursthouse] |
4336 | Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse] |
4334 | Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse] |
4361 | Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group [Hursthouse] |
4349 | Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action [Hursthouse] |
4352 | Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful' [Hursthouse] |
4353 | If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally? [Hursthouse] |
4346 | The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well [Hursthouse] |
4339 | According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right [Hursthouse] |
4354 | Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue [Hursthouse] |
4364 | Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others [Hursthouse] |
4356 | We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly [Hursthouse] |
4327 | Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse] |
4335 | 'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse] |
4328 | Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical [Hursthouse] |
4343 | We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples [Hursthouse] |
4338 | Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases [Hursthouse] |
4365 | We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons [Hursthouse] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
4350 | If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith? [Hursthouse] |
4151 | Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein] |
4159 | The human body is the best picture of the human soul [Wittgenstein] |