97 ideas
13634 | Satisfaction is 'truth in a model', which is a model of 'truth' [Shapiro] |
13643 | Aristotelian logic is complete [Shapiro] |
13689 | 'Theorems' are formulas provable from no premises at all [Sider] |
13705 | Truth tables assume truth functionality, and are just pictures of truth functions [Sider] |
13706 | Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial [Sider] |
13710 | In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary [Sider] |
13711 | System B introduces iterated modalities [Sider] |
13708 | S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas, because it is easy to be S5-valid [Sider] |
13712 | Epistemic accessibility is reflexive, and allows positive and negative introspection (KK and K¬K) [Sider] |
13714 | We can treat modal worlds as different times [Sider] |
13720 | Converse Barcan Formula: □∀αφ→∀α□φ [Sider] |
13718 | The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx may be a defect in modal logic [Sider] |
13723 | System B is needed to prove the Barcan Formula [Sider] |
13715 | You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics [Sider] |
13651 | A set is 'transitive' if contains every member of each of its members [Shapiro] |
13647 | Choice is essential for proving downward Löwenheim-Skolem [Shapiro] |
13631 | Are sets part of logic, or part of mathematics? [Shapiro] |
13654 | It is central to the iterative conception that membership is well-founded, with no infinite descending chains [Shapiro] |
13640 | Russell's paradox shows that there are classes which are not iterative sets [Shapiro] |
13666 | Iterative sets are not Boolean; the complement of an iterative set is not an iterative sets [Shapiro] |
13653 | 'Well-ordering' of a set is an irreflexive, transitive, and binary relation with a least element [Shapiro] |
13627 | There is no 'correct' logic for natural languages [Shapiro] |
13642 | Logic is the ideal for learning new propositions on the basis of others [Shapiro] |
13668 | Bernays (1918) formulated and proved the completeness of propositional logic [Shapiro] |
13669 | Can one develop set theory first, then derive numbers, or are numbers more basic? [Shapiro] |
13667 | Skolem and Gödel championed first-order, and Zermelo, Hilbert, and Bernays championed higher-order [Shapiro] |
13662 | First-order logic was an afterthought in the development of modern logic [Shapiro] |
13624 | The 'triumph' of first-order logic may be related to logicism and the Hilbert programme, which failed [Shapiro] |
13660 | Maybe compactness, semantic effectiveness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem properties are desirable [Shapiro] |
13673 | The notion of finitude is actually built into first-order languages [Shapiro] |
15944 | Second-order logic is better than set theory, since it only adds relations and operations, and nothing else [Shapiro, by Lavine] |
13629 | Broad standard semantics, or Henkin semantics with a subclass, or many-sorted first-order semantics? [Shapiro] |
13650 | Henkin semantics has separate variables ranging over the relations and over the functions [Shapiro] |
13645 | In standard semantics for second-order logic, a single domain fixes the ranges for the variables [Shapiro] |
13649 | Completeness, Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem fail in second-order standard semantics [Shapiro] |
13678 | The most popular account of logical consequence is the semantic or model-theoretic one [Sider] |
13679 | Maybe logical consequence is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation [Sider] |
13682 | Maybe logical consequence is impossibility of the premises being true and the consequent false [Sider] |
13680 | Maybe logical consequence is a primitive notion [Sider] |
13722 | A 'theorem' is an axiom, or the last line of a legitimate proof [Sider] |
13626 | Semantic consequence is ineffective in second-order logic [Shapiro] |
13637 | If a logic is incomplete, its semantic consequence relation is not effective [Shapiro] |
13632 | Finding the logical form of a sentence is difficult, and there are no criteria of correctness [Shapiro] |
13696 | When a variable is 'free' of the quantifier, the result seems incapable of truth or falsity [Sider] |
13700 | A 'total' function must always produce an output for a given domain [Sider] |
13703 | λ can treat 'is cold and hungry' as a single predicate [Sider] |
13674 | We might reduce ontology by using truth of sentences and terms, instead of using objects satisfying models [Shapiro] |
13688 | Good axioms should be indisputable logical truths [Sider] |
13687 | No assumptions in axiomatic proofs, so no conditional proof or reductio [Sider] |
13690 | Proof by induction 'on the length of the formula' deconstructs a formula into its accepted atoms [Sider] |
13691 | Induction has a 'base case', then an 'inductive hypothesis', and then the 'inductive step' [Sider] |
13685 | Natural deduction helpfully allows reasoning with assumptions [Sider] |
13686 | We can build proofs just from conclusions, rather than from plain formulae [Sider] |
13697 | Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments [Sider] |
13684 | The semantical notion of a logical truth is validity, being true in all interpretations [Sider] |
13704 | It is hard to say which are the logical truths in modal logic, especially for iterated modal operators [Sider] |
13633 | 'Satisfaction' is a function from models, assignments, and formulas to {true,false} [Shapiro] |
13724 | In model theory, first define truth, then validity as truth in all models, and consequence as truth-preservation [Sider] |
13644 | Semantics for models uses set-theory [Shapiro] |
13636 | An axiomatization is 'categorical' if its models are isomorphic, so there is really only one interpretation [Shapiro] |
13670 | Categoricity can't be reached in a first-order language [Shapiro] |
13658 | Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: each satisfiable countable set always has countable models [Shapiro] |
13659 | Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: each infinite model has infinite models of all sizes [Shapiro] |
13648 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show an explosion of infinite models, so 1st-order is useless for infinity [Shapiro] |
13675 | Substitutional semantics only has countably many terms, so Upward Löwenheim-Skolem trivially fails [Shapiro] |
13635 | 'Weakly sound' if every theorem is a logical truth; 'sound' if every deduction is a semantic consequence [Shapiro] |
13628 | We can live well without completeness in logic [Shapiro] |
13698 | In a complete logic you can avoid axiomatic proofs, by using models to show consequences [Sider] |
13630 | Non-compactness is a strength of second-order logic, enabling characterisation of infinite structures [Shapiro] |
13646 | Compactness is derived from soundness and completeness [Shapiro] |
13699 | Compactness surprisingly says that no contradictions can emerge when the set goes infinite [Sider] |
13661 | A language is 'semantically effective' if its logical truths are recursively enumerable [Shapiro] |
13641 | Complex numbers can be defined as reals, which are defined as rationals, then integers, then naturals [Shapiro] |
13676 | Only higher-order languages can specify that 0,1,2,... are all the natural numbers that there are [Shapiro] |
13677 | Natural numbers are the finite ordinals, and integers are equivalence classes of pairs of finite ordinals [Shapiro] |
13652 | The 'continuum' is the cardinality of the powerset of a denumerably infinite set [Shapiro] |
13657 | First-order arithmetic can't even represent basic number theory [Shapiro] |
13701 | A single second-order sentence validates all of arithmetic - but this can't be proved axiomatically [Sider] |
13656 | Some sets of natural numbers are definable in set-theory but not in arithmetic [Shapiro] |
13664 | Logicism is distinctive in seeking a universal language, and denying that logic is a series of abstractions [Shapiro] |
13625 | Mathematics and logic have no border, and logic must involve mathematics and its ontology [Shapiro] |
13663 | Some reject formal properties if they are not defined, or defined impredicatively [Shapiro] |
13692 | A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation [Sider] |
13695 | Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator [Sider] |
13693 | A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification [Sider] |
13694 | We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings [Sider] |
13683 | A relation is a feature of multiple objects taken together [Sider] |
13638 | Properties are often seen as intensional; equiangular and equilateral are different, despite identity of objects [Shapiro] |
13702 | The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider] |
13721 | 'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider] |
13707 | Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider] |
13709 | Logical truths must be necessary if anything is [Sider] |
13716 | 'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true [Sider] |
13717 | Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider] |
13719 | Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |