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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic' and 'Definitions'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
11223 Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta]
11215 Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
11225 A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta]
11227 The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
11224 Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta]
11226 Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta]
11221 A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
11217 Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11216 If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
11218 Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
11220 Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14626 In S5 matters of possibility and necessity are non-contingent [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
11222 The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
14625 Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
14623 Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B) [Williamson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
14624 Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14531 Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
14628 Imagination is important, in evaluating possibility and necessity, via counterfactuals [Williamson]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]