Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula' and 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
19441 All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
19442 I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
19444 Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach]
19445 A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
19443 Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
15134 The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
15141 Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
15140 The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
15131 If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
15135 If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson]
15139 Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
18492 Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15136 Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15138 Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
15137 If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
19446 To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
15142 Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
19447 The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
15133 A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson]