Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Truth and Ontology' and 'The Passions'

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54 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom needs both thought and passion, with each reflecting on the other [Solomon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Philosophy is creating an intellectual conceptual structure for life [Solomon]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Distinguishing reason from passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' theory [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
I say bodily chemistry and its sensations have nothing to do with emotions [Solomon]
Emotions are judgements about ourselves, and our place in the world [Solomon]
Emotions are defined by their objects [Solomon]
The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon]
Emotions can be analysed under fifteen headings [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Some emotions are externally directed, others internally [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
It is only our passions which give our lives meaning [Solomon]
Which emotions we feel depends on our sense of our own powers [Solomon]
The passions are subjective, concerning what is important to me, rather than facts [Solomon]
Emotions are strategies for maximising our sense of dignity and self-esteem [Solomon]
Passions exist as emotions, moods and desires, which all generate meaning [Solomon]
The Myth of the Passions says they are irrational, uncontrolled and damaging [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
Feeling is a superficial aspect of emotion, and may be indeterminate, or even absent [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
There are no 'basic' emotions, only socially prevalent ones [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
It is reason which needs the anchorage of passions, rather than vice versa [Solomon]
Dividing ourselves into confrontational reason and passion destroys our harmonious whole [Solomon]
The supposed irrationality of our emotions is often tactless or faulty expression of them [Solomon]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Emotions are our life force, and the source of most of our values [Solomon]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Lovers adopt the interests of their beloved, rather than just valuing them [Solomon]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
'Absurdity' is just the result of our wrong choices in life [Solomon]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
Ideologies are mythologies which guide our actions [Solomon]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks]
Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks]
Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]