Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Right and the Good' and 'Nature and Meaning of Numbers'

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65 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 9. Recursive Definition
Dedekind proved definition by recursion, and thus proved the basic laws of arithmetic [Dedekind, by Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
An infinite set maps into its own proper subset [Dedekind, by Reck/Price]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
We have the idea of self, and an idea of that idea, and so on, so infinite ideas are available [Dedekind, by Potter]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Dedekind originally thought more in terms of mereology than of sets [Dedekind, by Potter]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers are free creations of the human mind, to understand differences [Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Dedekind defined the integers, rationals and reals in terms of just the natural numbers [Dedekind, by George/Velleman]
Order, not quantity, is central to defining numbers [Dedekind, by Monk]
Ordinals can define cardinals, as the smallest ordinal that maps the set [Dedekind, by Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Dedekind's ordinals are just members of any progression whatever [Dedekind, by Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
Dedekind's axiom that his Cut must be filled has the advantages of theft over honest toil [Dedekind, by Russell]
Dedekind says each cut matches a real; logicists say the cuts are the reals [Dedekind, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
In counting we see the human ability to relate, correspond and represent [Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / b. Mark of the infinite
A system S is said to be infinite when it is similar to a proper part of itself [Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Dedekind gives a base number which isn't a successor, then adds successors and induction [Dedekind, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Zero is a member, and all successors; numbers are the intersection of sets satisfying this [Dedekind, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Categoricity implies that Dedekind has characterised the numbers, because it has one domain [Rumfitt on Dedekind]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
Induction is proved in Dedekind, an axiom in Peano; the latter seems simpler and clearer [Dedekind, by Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Dedekind originated the structuralist conception of mathematics [Dedekind, by MacBride]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
Dedekindian abstraction talks of 'positions', where Cantorian abstraction talks of similar objects [Dedekind, by Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
A thing is completely determined by all that can be thought concerning it [Dedekind]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Identical objects must have identical value [Ross]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Dedekind said numbers were abstracted from systems of objects, leaving only their position [Dedekind, by Dummett]
We derive the natural numbers, by neglecting everything of a system except distinctness and order [Dedekind]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Dedekind has a conception of abstraction which is not psychologistic [Dedekind, by Tait]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross]
The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J]
The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross]
The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross]
The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross]
The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross]
If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross]
In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross]
Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross]
Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross]
Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross]
No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross]
Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG]
We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross]
We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]