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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Physics and Philosophy' and 'Concepts'

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
If it can't be expressed mathematically, it can't occur in nature? [Heisenberg]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Quantum theory shows that exact science does not need dogmatic realism [Heisenberg]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Quantum theory does not introduce minds into atomic events [Heisenberg]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
We can retain the idea of 'substance', as indestructible mass or energy [Heisenberg]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Basic particles have a mathematical form, which is more important than their substance [Heisenberg]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
We give a mathematical account of a system of natural connections in order to clarify them [Heisenberg]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence]
Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence]
The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence]
Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence]
The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence]
It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence]
Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence]
People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence]
Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence]
Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence]
The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Seven theories in science: mechanics, heat, electricity, quantum, particles, relativity, life [Heisenberg, by PG]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
Energy is that which moves, and is the substance from which everything is made [Heisenberg]
Energy is an unchanging substance, having many forms, and causing all change [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Maxwell introduced real fields, which transferred forces from point to point [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Radiation interference needs waves, but radiation photoelectric effects needs particles [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
An atom's stability after collisions needs explaining (which Newton's mechanics can't do) [Heisenberg]
Position is complementary to velocity or momentum, so the whole system is indeterminate [Heisenberg]
It was formerly assumed that electromagnetic waves could not be a reality in themselves [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
So-called 'empty' space is the carrier of geometry and kinematics [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
In relativity the length of the 'present moment' is relative to distance from the observer [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]