19 ideas
10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |
9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |