19 ideas
9108 | From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham] |
9107 | A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham] |
16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach] |
9106 | The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham] |
9113 | Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham] |
9110 | The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham] |
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
15388 | Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
9109 | If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
9105 | Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |