Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Begriffsschrift' and 'Properties'

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Frege changed philosophy by extending logic's ability to check the grounds of thinking [Potter on Frege]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
We should not describe human laws of thought, but how to correctly track truth [Frege, by Fisher]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
I don't use 'subject' and 'predicate' in my way of representing a judgement [Frege]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / d. Universal quantifier ∀
For Frege, 'All A's are B's' means that the concept A implies the concept B [Frege, by Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Frege has a judgement stroke (vertical, asserting or judging) and a content stroke (horizontal, expressing) [Frege, by Weiner]
The laws of logic are boundless, so we want the few whose power contains the others [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
In 1879 Frege developed second order logic [Frege, by Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Frege replaced Aristotle's subject/predicate form with function/argument form [Frege, by Weiner]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
A quantifier is a second-level predicate (which explains how it contributes to truth-conditions) [Frege, by George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
For Frege the variable ranges over all objects [Frege, by Tait]
Frege's domain for variables is all objects, but modern interpretations first fix the domain [Dummett on Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Frege introduced quantifiers for generality [Frege, by Weiner]
Frege reduced most quantifiers to 'everything' combined with 'not' [Frege, by McCullogh]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
Proof theory began with Frege's definition of derivability [Frege, by Prawitz]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
Frege produced axioms for logic, though that does not now seem the natural basis for logic [Frege, by Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
It may be possible to define induction in terms of the ancestral relation [Frege, by Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Frege's logic has a hierarchy of object, property, property-of-property etc. [Frege, by Smith,P]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Existence is not a first-order property, but the instantiation of a property [Frege, by Read]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong]
To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong]
There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Frege's account was top-down and decompositional, not bottom-up and compositional [Frege, by Potter]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong]
The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The predicate 'exists' is actually a natural language expression for a quantifier [Frege, by Weiner]