38 ideas
| 5182 | Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley] |
| 6864 | Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley] |
| 11051 | Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna] |
| 11054 | Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna] |
| 11070 | 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna] |
| 11071 | 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna] |
| 11088 | We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna] |
| 11059 | Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna] |
| 11089 | Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna] |
| 11058 | Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna] |
| 11072 | Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna] |
| 11061 | Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna] |
| 10999 | Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read] |
| 13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
| 11063 | Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna] |
| 11055 | Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna] |
| 6422 | Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell] |
| 7966 | Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley] |
| 11083 | A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna] |
| 11086 | Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna] |
| 11084 | Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna] |
| 11085 | Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna] |
| 6404 | British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling] |
| 22299 | Bradley's objective idealism accepts reality (the Absolute), but says we can't fully describe it [Bradley, by Potter] |
| 21343 | Qualities and relations are mere appearance; the Absolute is a single undifferentiated substance [Bradley, by Heil] |
| 11077 | Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna] |
| 11080 | Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna] |
| 11078 | Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna] |
| 11053 | Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna] |
| 11081 | Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna] |
| 11082 | Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna] |
| 11067 | Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna] |
| 11068 | One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna] |
| 11047 | Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna] |
| 11048 | Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna] |
| 11046 | Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna] |
| 11045 | Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna] |
| 6406 | Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley] |