24 ideas
13931 | By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger] |
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
13925 | Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger] |
13924 | The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger] |
13930 | Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger] |
13927 | We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger] |
13928 | If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger] |
13929 | Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger] |
13926 | Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger] |
20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |