Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intuitionism: an Introduction', 'The soul's dependence on the body' and 'Naming and Necessity notes and addenda'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

22 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
23269 Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
8754 Logic is dependent on mathematics, not the other way round [Heyting, by Shapiro]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
17000 We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
11868 A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
17044 A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
16999 A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
17058 What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke]
4970 What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
17059 Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
4950 Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
17003 Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
9221 The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
17052 The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
4969 I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
23266 The spirit in the soul wants freedom, power and honour [Galen]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
23219 Stopping the heart doesn't terminate activity; pressing the brain does that [Galen, by Cobb]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
23264 Philosophers think faculties are in substances, and invent a faculty for every activity [Galen]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
23220 The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision [Galen]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
23265 The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
4956 A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
17032 Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
23268 We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen]