12 ideas
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| 6950 | You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman] |
| 6954 | A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman] |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| 8754 | Logic is dependent on mathematics, not the other way round [Heyting, by Shapiro] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
| 6955 | Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman] |
| 6952 | Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman] |
| 6953 | All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman] |
| 6951 | Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman] |