Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works (all lost)', 'The Morality of Happiness' and 'Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
If all laws were abolished, philosophers would still live as they do now [Aristippus elder]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron]
I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]
Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
Only the Cyrenaics reject the idea of a final moral end [Aristippus elder, by Annas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The road of freedom is the surest route to happiness [Aristippus elder, by Xenophon]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
Pleasure is the good, because we always seek it, it satisfies us, and its opposite is the most avoidable thing [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius]
Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas]
People who object to extravagant pleasures just love money [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Errors result from external influence, and should be corrected, not hated [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius]