Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Action' and 'Thought and Reality'

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
If all laws were abolished, philosophers would still live as they do now [Aristippus elder]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett]
The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett]
Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett]
If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
Only the Cyrenaics reject the idea of a final moral end [Aristippus elder, by Annas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The road of freedom is the surest route to happiness [Aristippus elder, by Xenophon]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
People who object to extravagant pleasures just love money [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius]
Pleasure is the good, because we always seek it, it satisfies us, and its opposite is the most avoidable thing [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Errors result from external influence, and should be corrected, not hated [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett]