Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works (all lost)', 'Ordinary Objects' and 'Properties and Predicates'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


34 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
For the Cyrenaics experience was not enough to give certainty about reality [Aristippus young, by Plutarch]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Even the foolish may have some virtues [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Actions are influenced by circumstances, so Cyrenaics say felons should be reformed, not hated [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Cyrenaics teach that honour, justice and shame are all based on custom and fashion [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
For a Cyrenaic no one is of equal importance to himself [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Cyrenaics say wise men are self-sufficient, needing no friends [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor]