Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Necessary Beings' and 'Liberalism: the basics'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


53 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale]
With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale]
'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale]
Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale]
Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale]
Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale]
If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
Rawls's theory cannot justify liberalism, since it presupposes free and equal participants [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
People with strong prior beliefs would have nothing to do with a veil of ignorance [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Societies need shared values, so conservatism is right if rational discussion of values is impossible [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
The universalism of utilitarianism implies a world state [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals value freedom and equality, but the society itself must decide on its values [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Modern libertarian societies still provide education and some housing [Charvet]
Liberalism needs people to either have equal autonomy, or everyone to have enough autonomy [Charvet]
Kant places a higher value on the universal rational will than on the people asserting it [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
Liberalism asserts maximum freedom, but that must be equal for all participants [Charvet]
Egalitarian liberals prefer equality (either of input or outcome) to liberty [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
Liberals promote community and well-being - because all good societies need them [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / f. Multiculturalism
Identity multiculturalism emerges from communitarianism, preferring community to humanity [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
For communitarians it seems that you must accept the culture you are born into [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Give by ability and receive by need, rather than a free labour market [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Allowing defamatory speech is against society's interests, by blurring which people are trustworthy [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
'Freedom from' is an empty idea, if the freedom is not from impediments to my desires [Charvet]
Positive freedom can lead to coercion, if you are forced to do what you chose to do [Charvet]
First level autonomy is application of personal values; second level is criticising them [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Mere equality, as in two trees being the same height, has no value at all [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Inequalities are worse if they seem to be your fault, rather than social facts [Charvet]
Money allows unlimited inequalities, and we obviously all agree to money [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
The rule of law is mainly to restrict governments [Charvet]
The 1689 Bill of Rights denied the monarch new courts, or the right to sit as judge [Charvet]
From 1701 only parliament could remove judges, whose decisions could not be discussed [Charvet]
Justice superior to the rule of law is claimed on behalf of the workers, or the will of the nation [Charvet]
The rule of law mainly benefits those with property and liberties [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
Welfare is needed if citizens are to accept the obligations of a liberal state [Charvet]