40 ideas
| 8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
| 10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
| 8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
| 8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
| 10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
| 10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
| 8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
| 10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
| 8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
| 8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
| 8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
| 8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
| 10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
| 10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
| 10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
| 10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
| 10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
| 10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
| 10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
| 10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
| 8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
| 10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
| 8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
| 8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
| 10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
| 10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
| 8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
| 8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
| 8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
| 8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
| 8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
| 8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
| 8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
| 10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
| 8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
| 10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
| 10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
| 10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |
| 8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
| 8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |