Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works (all lost)', 'Could There Be Unicorns?' and 'Reference and Necessity'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett]
Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett]
If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett]