12 ideas
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
14187 | If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter [Read] |
14188 | Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible [Read] |
14182 | If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence [Read] |
14183 | Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why? [Read] |
14184 | In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway [Read] |
14186 | Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts [Read] |
14185 | Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |