14 ideas
| 18755 | Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee] |
| 18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
| 18761 | Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee] |
| 18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
| 18754 | Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee] |
| 18757 | Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee] |
| 18760 | The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee] |
| 19269 | 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke] |
| 19271 | No rule can be fully explained [Kripke] |
| 7305 | Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A] |
| 19270 | If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke] |
| 11076 | Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna] |
| 18762 | A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee] |
| 11075 | The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna] |