Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory' and 'Logic for Philosophy'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


97 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
In the 17th-18th centuries morality offered a cure for egoism, through altruism [MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 6. Twentieth Century Thought
Twentieth century social life is re-enacting eighteenth century philosophy [MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy has been marginalised by its failure in the Enlightenment to replace religion [MacIntyre]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Proof is a barren idea in philosophy, and the best philosophy never involves proof [MacIntyre]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
'Theorems' are formulas provable from no premises at all [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth tables assume truth functionality, and are just pictures of truth functions [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial [Sider]
In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
System B introduces iterated modalities [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas, because it is easy to be S5-valid [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 5. Epistemic Logic
Epistemic accessibility is reflexive, and allows positive and negative introspection (KK and K¬K) [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
We can treat modal worlds as different times [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
Converse Barcan Formula: □∀αφ→∀α□φ [Sider]
The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx may be a defect in modal logic [Sider]
System B is needed to prove the Barcan Formula [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
The most popular account of logical consequence is the semantic or model-theoretic one [Sider]
Maybe logical consequence is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation [Sider]
Maybe logical consequence is impossibility of the premises being true and the consequent false [Sider]
Maybe logical consequence is a primitive notion [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
A 'theorem' is an axiom, or the last line of a legitimate proof [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
When a variable is 'free' of the quantifier, the result seems incapable of truth or falsity [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
A 'total' function must always produce an output for a given domain [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
λ can treat 'is cold and hungry' as a single predicate [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
Good axioms should be indisputable logical truths [Sider]
No assumptions in axiomatic proofs, so no conditional proof or reductio [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
Proof by induction 'on the length of the formula' deconstructs a formula into its accepted atoms [Sider]
Induction has a 'base case', then an 'inductive hypothesis', and then the 'inductive step' [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Natural deduction helpfully allows reasoning with assumptions [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 6. Sequent Calculi
We can build proofs just from conclusions, rather than from plain formulae [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
The semantical notion of a logical truth is validity, being true in all interpretations [Sider]
It is hard to say which are the logical truths in modal logic, especially for iterated modal operators [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
In model theory, first define truth, then validity as truth in all models, and consequence as truth-preservation [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
In a complete logic you can avoid axiomatic proofs, by using models to show consequences [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Compactness surprisingly says that no contradictions can emerge when the set goes infinite [Sider]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
A single second-order sentence validates all of arithmetic - but this can't be proved axiomatically [Sider]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation [Sider]
Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator [Sider]
A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification [Sider]
We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings [Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
A relation is a feature of multiple objects taken together [Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical truths must be necessary if anything is [Sider]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true [Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
To find empiricism and science in the same culture is surprising, as they are really incompatible [MacIntyre]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Unpredictability doesn't entail inexplicability, and predictability doesn't entail explicability [MacIntyre]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Social sciences discover no law-like generalisations, and tend to ignore counterexamples [MacIntyre]
Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
I can only make decisions if I see myself as part of a story [MacIntyre]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
AI can't predict innovation, or consequences, or external relations, or external events [MacIntyre]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
The good life for man is the life spent seeking the good life for man [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
We still have the appearance and language of morality, but we no longer understand it [MacIntyre]
Unlike expressions of personal preference, evaluative expressions do not depend on context [MacIntyre]
Moral judgements now are anachronisms from a theistic age [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
The failure of Enlightenment attempts to justify morality will explain our own culture [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Mention of 'intuition' in morality means something has gone wrong with the argument [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
When 'man' is thought of individually, apart from all roles, it ceases to be a functional concept [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular [MacIntyre]
The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning [MacIntyre]
Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then') [MacIntyre]
Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Maybe we can only understand rules if we first understand the virtues [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue is secondary to a role-figure, defined within a culture [MacIntyre, by Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Characters are the masks worn by moral philosophies [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
If morality just is emotion, there are no external criteria for judging emotions [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Since Moore thinks the right action produces the most good, he is a utilitarian [MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
There are no natural or human rights, and belief in them is nonsense [MacIntyre]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
If God is omniscient, he confronts no as yet unmade decisions, so decisions are impossible [MacIntyre]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus]