61 ideas
| 12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
| 12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
| 12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
| 12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
| 12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
| 12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
| 12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
| 12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
| 12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
| 12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
| 12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
| 11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
| 12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
| 12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
| 12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
| 13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
| 12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
| 12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
| 12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
| 12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
| 12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
| 12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
| 12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
| 12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
| 12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
| 12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
| 12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
| 12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
| 21432 | Culture is the struggle to agree what is normal [Gibson,A] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
| 12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |