91 ideas
| 1695 | Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle] |
| 2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
| 2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
| 2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
| 1698 | Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle] |
| 1697 | The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle] |
| 2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
| 11034 | The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle] |
| 18367 | A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle] |
| 11033 | Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle] |
| 11044 | One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle] |
| 11042 | Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle] |
| 11041 | Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle] |
| 11286 | Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle] |
| 1700 | There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle] |
| 1699 | A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle] |
| 18366 | Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle] |
| 11035 | There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle] |
| 3311 | The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
| 13121 | Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff] |
| 16116 | Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 21345 | Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil] |
| 16155 | Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 11032 | Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle] |
| 11038 | We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle] |
| 2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
| 16739 | Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
| 11037 | Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle] |
| 2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
| 16154 | Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 12351 | Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 1694 | Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle] |
| 16091 | Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 11280 | Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11040 | A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle] |
| 11036 | A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle] |
| 16140 | Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 10965 | In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
| 8287 | Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe] |
| 12350 | Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle] |
| 11039 | A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle] |
| 12361 | Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 3315 | Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
| 2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
| 2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
| 2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
| 2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
| 2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
| 2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
| 2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
| 2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
| 2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
| 2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
| 2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
| 2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
| 2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
| 2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
| 2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
| 2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
| 2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
| 2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
| 2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
| 2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
| 2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
| 2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
| 2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
| 2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
| 2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
| 2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
| 2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
| 2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
| 2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
| 2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
| 2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
| 2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
| 2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
| 12349 | Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 11837 | Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle] |
| 2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
| 2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
| 11043 | It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle] |
| 1696 | Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle] |
| 21241 | Even the fool can hold 'a being than which none greater exists' in his understanding [Anselm] |
| 21243 | An existing thing is even greater if its non-existence is inconceivable [Anselm] |
| 21244 | Conceiving a greater being than God leads to absurdity [Anselm] |
| 21242 | If that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists, that is greater than the mere idea [Anselm] |
| 1421 | A perfection must be independent and unlimited, and the necessary existence of Anselm's second proof gives this [Malcolm on Anselm] |
| 21245 | The word 'God' can be denied, but understanding shows God must exist [Anselm] |
| 21246 | Guanilo says a supremely fertile island must exist, just because we can conceive it [Anselm] |
| 21247 | Nonexistence is impossible for the greatest thinkable thing, which has no beginning or end [Anselm] |
| 1420 | Anselm's first proof fails because existence isn't a real predicate, so it can't be a perfection [Malcolm on Anselm] |