Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Politics', 'fragments/reports' and 'Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations)'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


290 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
The syntactic category is primary, and the ontological category is derivative [Frege, by Wright,C]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Never lose sight of the distinction between concept and object [Frege]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Frege was the first to give linguistic answers to non-linguistic questions [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege initiated linguistic philosophy, studying number through the sense of sentences [Frege, by Dummett]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Frege developed formal systems to avoid unnoticed assumptions [Frege, by Lavine]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Thoughts have a natural order, to which human thinking is drawn [Frege, by Yablo]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Frege sees no 'intersubjective' category, between objective and subjective [Dummett on Frege]
Keep the psychological and subjective separate from the logical and objective [Frege]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Originally Frege liked contextual definitions, but later preferred them fully explicit [Frege, by Dummett]
Nothing should be defined in terms of that to which it is conceptually prior [Frege, by Dummett]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Proof aims to remove doubts, but also to show the interdependence of truths [Frege]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
You can't transfer external properties unchanged to apply to ideas [Frege]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true [Frege, by Wright,C]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Frege agreed with Euclid that the axioms of logic and mathematics are known through self-evidence [Frege, by Burge]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The null set is only defensible if it is the extension of an empty concept [Frege, by Burge]
It is because a concept can be empty that there is such a thing as the empty class [Frege, by Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
We can introduce new objects, as equivalence classes of objects already known [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege introduced the standard device, of defining logical objects with equivalence classes [Frege, by Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Frege, unlike Russell, has infinite individuals because numbers are individuals [Frege, by Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
A class is, for Frege, the extension of a concept [Frege, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Convert "Jupiter has four moons" into "the number of Jupiter's moons is four" [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
Despite Gödel, Frege's epistemic ordering of all the truths is still plausible [Frege, by Burge]
The primitive simples of arithmetic are the essence, determining the subject, and its boundaries [Frege, by Jeshion]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Each horse doesn't fall under the concept 'horse that draws the carriage', because all four are needed [Oliver/Smiley on Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
We can show that a concept is consistent by producing something which falls under it [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
To understand axioms you must grasp their logical power and priority [Frege, by Burge]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
We cannot define numbers from the idea of a series, because numbers must precede that [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
Treating 0 as a number avoids antinomies involving treating 'nobody' as a person [Frege, by Dummett]
For Frege 'concept' and 'extension' are primitive, but 'zero' and 'successor' are defined [Frege, by Chihara]
If objects exist because they fall under a concept, 0 is the object under which no objects fall [Frege, by Dummett]
Nought is the number belonging to the concept 'not identical with itself' [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
We can say 'a and b are F' if F is 'wise', but not if it is 'one' [Frege]
One is the Number which belongs to the concept "identical with 0" [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
You can abstract concepts from the moon, but the number one is not among them [Frege]
Units can be equal without being identical [Tait on Frege]
Frege says only concepts which isolate and avoid arbitrary division can give units [Frege, by Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Frege's 'isolation' could be absence of overlap, or drawing conceptual boundaries [Frege, by Koslicki]
Non-arbitrary division means that what falls under the concept cannot be divided into more of the same [Frege, by Koslicki]
Our concepts decide what is countable, as in seeing the leaves of the tree, or the foliage [Frege, by Koslicki]
A concept creating a unit must isolate and unify what falls under it [Frege]
Frege says counting is determining what number belongs to a given concept [Frege, by Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
Frege's one-to-one correspondence replaces well-ordering, because infinities can't be counted [Frege, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
The number of natural numbers is not a natural number [Frege, by George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Arithmetical statements can't be axioms, because they are provable [Frege, by Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
A statement of number contains a predication about a concept [Frege]
Frege's problem is explaining the particularity of numbers by general laws [Frege, by Burge]
Individual numbers are best derived from the number one, and increase by one [Frege]
'Exactly ten gallons' may not mean ten things instantiate 'gallon' [Rumfitt on Frege]
Numerical statements have first-order logical form, so must refer to objects [Frege, by Hodes]
The Number for F is the extension of 'equal to F' (or maybe just F itself) [Frege]
Numbers are objects because they partake in identity statements [Frege, by Bostock]
Frege had a motive to treat numbers as objects, but not a justification [Hale/Wright on Frege]
Frege claims that numbers are objects, as opposed to them being Fregean concepts [Frege, by Wright,C]
Numbers are second-level, ascribing properties to concepts rather than to objects [Frege, by Wright,C]
For Frege, successor was a relation, not a function [Frege, by Dummett]
Numbers are more than just 'second-level concepts', since existence is also one [Frege, by George/Velleman]
"Number of x's such that ..x.." is a functional expression, yielding a name when completed [Frege, by George/Velleman]
Frege gives an incoherent account of extensions resulting from abstraction [Fine,K on Frege]
For Frege the number of F's is a collection of first-level concepts [Frege, by George/Velleman]
A cardinal number may be defined as a class of similar classes [Frege, by Russell]
Numbers need to be objects, to define the extension of the concept of each successor to n [Frege, by George/Velleman]
The number of F's is the extension of the second level concept 'is equipollent with F' [Frege, by Tait]
Frege showed that numbers attach to concepts, not to objects [Frege, by Wiggins]
Frege replaced Cantor's sets as the objects of equinumerosity attributions with concepts [Frege, by Tait]
Zero is defined using 'is not self-identical', and one by using the concept of zero [Frege, by Weiner]
Frege said logical predication implies classes, which are arithmetical objects [Frege, by Morris,M]
Frege started with contextual definition, but then switched to explicit extensional definition [Frege, by Wright,C]
Each number, except 0, is the number of the concept of all of its predecessors [Frege, by Wright,C]
Frege's account of cardinals fails in modern set theory, so they are now defined differently [Dummett on Frege]
Frege's incorrect view is that a number is an equivalence class [Benacerraf on Frege]
The natural number n is the set of n-membered sets [Frege, by Yourgrau]
A set doesn't have a fixed number, because the elements can be seen in different ways [Yourgrau on Frege]
If you can subdivide objects many ways for counting, you can do that to set-elements too [Yourgrau on Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
'The number of Fs' is the extension (a collection of first-level concepts) of the concept 'equinumerous with F' [Frege, by George/Velleman]
Frege's cardinals (equivalences of one-one correspondences) is not permissible in ZFC [Frege, by Wolf,RS]
Hume's Principle fails to implicitly define numbers, because of the Julius Caesar [Frege, by Potter]
Frege thinks number is fundamentally bound up with one-one correspondence [Frege, by Heck]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
The words 'There are exactly Julius Caesar moons of Mars' are gibberish [Rumfitt on Frege]
'Julius Caesar' isn't a number because numbers inherit properties of 0 and successor [Frege, by George/Velleman]
From within logic, how can we tell whether an arbitrary object like Julius Caesar is a number? [Frege, by Friend]
Frege said 2 is the extension of all pairs (so Julius Caesar isn't 2, because he's not an extension) [Frege, by Shapiro]
Fregean numbers are numbers, and not 'Caesar', because they correlate 1-1 [Frege, by Wright,C]
One-one correlations imply normal arithmetic, but don't explain our concept of a number [Frege, by Bostock]
Our definition will not tell us whether or not Julius Caesar is a number [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
If numbers can be derived from logic, then set theory is superfluous [Frege, by Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
If numbers are supposed to be patterns, each number can have many patterns [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Numbers seem to be objects because they exactly fit the inference patterns for identities [Frege]
Frege's platonism proposes that objects are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Wright,C]
How can numbers be external (one pair of boots is two boots), or subjective (and so relative)? [Frege, by Weiner]
Identities refer to objects, so numbers must be objects [Frege, by Weiner]
Numbers are not physical, and not ideas - they are objective and non-sensible [Frege]
Numbers are objects, because they can take the definite article, and can't be plurals [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Frege's logicism aimed at removing the reliance of arithmetic on intuition [Frege, by Yourgrau]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
There is no physical difference between two boots and one pair of boots [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
It appears that numbers are adjectives, but they don't apply to a single object [Frege, by George/Velleman]
Numerical adjectives are of the same second-level type as the existential quantifier [Frege, by George/Velleman]
'Jupiter has many moons' won't read as 'The number of Jupiter's moons equals the number many' [Rumfitt on Frege]
The number 'one' can't be a property, if any object can be viewed as one or not one [Frege]
For science, we can translate adjectival numbers into noun form [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is analytic [Frege, by Weiner]
Logicism shows that no empirical truths are needed to justify arithmetic [Frege, by George/Velleman]
Frege offered a Platonist version of logicism, committed to cardinal and real numbers [Frege, by Hale/Wright]
Mathematics has no special axioms of its own, but follows from principles of logic (with definitions) [Frege, by Bostock]
Arithmetic must be based on logic, because of its total generality [Frege, by Jeshion]
Numbers are definable in terms of mapping items which fall under concepts [Frege, by Scruton]
Arithmetic is analytic and a priori, and thus it is part of logic [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Frege only managed to prove that arithmetic was analytic with a logic that included set-theory [Quine on Frege]
Frege's platonism and logicism are in conflict, if logic must dictates an infinity of objects [Wright,C on Frege]
Why should the existence of pure logic entail the existence of objects? [George/Velleman on Frege]
Frege's belief in logicism and in numerical objects seem uncomfortable together [Hodes on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism fails to recognise types of symbols, and also meta-games [Frege, by Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Frege was completing Bolzano's work, of expelling intuition from number theory and analysis [Frege, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
Abstraction from things produces concepts, and numbers are in the concepts [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / e. Psychologism
Mental states are irrelevant to mathematics, because they are vague and fluctuating [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege]
The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege]
Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
'Ancestral' relations are derived by iterating back from a given relation [Frege, by George/Velleman]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Frege, by Smith,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Not all objects are spatial; 4 can still be an object, despite lacking spatial co-ordinates [Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Frege says singular terms denote objects, numerals are singular terms, so numbers exist [Frege, by Hale]
Frege establishes abstract objects independently from concrete ones, by falling under a concept [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
For Frege, objects just are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Hale/Wright]
Without concepts we would not have any objects [Frege, by Shapiro]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Frege's universe comes already divided into objects [Frege, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan]
Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity between objects is not a consequence of identity, but part of what 'identity' means [Frege, by Dummett]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle]
To understand a thought you must understand its logical structure [Frege, by Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Mathematicians just accept self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive [Frege]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
An a priori truth is one derived from general laws which do not require proof [Frege]
A truth is a priori if it can be proved entirely from general unproven laws [Frege]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuitions cannot be communicated [Frege, by Burge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
Justifications show the ordering of truths, and the foundation is what is self-evident [Frege, by Jeshion]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is merely psychological, with a principle that it can actually establish laws [Frege]
In science one observation can create high probability, while a thousand might prove nothing [Frege]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
The nature of each thing is its mature state [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Ideas are not spatial, and don't have distances between them [Frege]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thought is the same everywhere, and the laws of thought do not vary [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C]
A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner]
Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki]
Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
A concept is a possible predicate of a singular judgement [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Defining 'direction' by parallelism doesn't tell you whether direction is a line [Dummett on Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Frege accepts abstraction to the concept of all sets equipollent to a given one [Tait on Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Frege himself abstracts away from tone and color [Yablo on Frege]
If we abstract 'from' two cats, the units are not black or white, or cats [Tait on Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Frege's logical abstaction identifies a common feature as the maximal set of equivalent objects [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege's 'parallel' and 'direction' don't have the same content, as we grasp 'parallel' first [Yablo on Frege]
Frege put the idea of abstraction on a rigorous footing [Frege, by Fine,K]
Fregean abstraction creates concepts which are equivalences between initial items [Frege, by Fine,K]
We create new abstract concepts by carving up the content in a different way [Frege]
You can't simultaneously fix the truth-conditions of a sentence and the domain of its variables [Dummett on Frege]
From basing 'parallel' on identity of direction, Frege got all abstractions from identity statements [Frege, by Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Words in isolation seem to have ideas as meanings, but words have meaning in propositions [Frege]
Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition [Frege]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
A statement is analytic if substitution of synonyms can make it a logical truth [Frege, by Boghossian]
Frege considered analyticity to be an epistemic concept [Frege, by Shapiro]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
A community can lack self-control [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city [Aristotle]
People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The law is the mean [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice is a virtue of communities [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle]
People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle]
Only humans have reason [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient [Aristotle]
A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle]
People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city [Aristotle]
Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions [Aristotle]
A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude [Aristotle]
A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A city aims at living well [Aristotle]
What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? [Aristotle]
The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city [Aristotle]
Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle]
The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle]
A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage [Aristotle]
Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle]
The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life [Aristotle]
Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim [Aristotle]
The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people [Aristotle]
We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good [Aristotle]
The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man [Aristotle]
A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Kings should be selected according to character [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle]
People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it [Aristotle]
The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy [Aristotle]
The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices [Aristotle]
Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it [Aristotle]
Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle]
Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality [Aristotle]
Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law [Aristotle]
Choosing officials by lot is democratic [Aristotle]
The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling [Aristotle]
It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle]
No office is permanent in a democracy [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Ultimate democracy is tyranny [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
We aim to understand the best possible community for free people [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things [Aristotle]
Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy [Aristotle]
The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class [Aristotle]
Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements [Aristotle]
There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle]
It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle]
We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share [Aristotle]
The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning [Aristotle]
Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle]
Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property should be owned privately, but used communally [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
Justice is the order in a political community [Aristotle]
Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals [Aristotle]
The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle]
Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle]
Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle]
Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues [Aristotle]
It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle]
A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private [Aristotle]
The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
To learn something, you must know that you don't know [Frege]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
The laws of number are not laws of nature, but are laws of the laws of nature [Frege]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
Existence is not a first-level concept (of God), but a second-level property of concepts [Frege, by Potter]
Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for God fails [Frege]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle]