50 ideas
| 21360 | Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle] |
| 22271 | Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Aristotle, by Potter] |
| 11060 | Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna] |
| 18909 | Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen] |
| 8080 | Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
| 13912 | Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 8071 | Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
| 13819 | Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle] |
| 9403 | There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle] |
| 11148 | Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle] |
| 18896 | Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers] |
| 3300 | Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
| 11149 | Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle] |
| 8079 | Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
| 13212 | Infinity is only potential, never actual [Aristotle] |
| 13221 | Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle] |
| 16100 | True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle] |
| 16101 | A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle] |
| 12133 | If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle] |
| 15200 | How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
| 14761 | Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart] |
| 13213 | All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle] |
| 12134 | Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle] |
| 16572 | Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle] |
| 16573 | Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle] |
| 13214 | The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle] |
| 13215 | If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle] |
| 14641 | A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle] |
| 16717 | Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle] |
| 18911 | Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen] |
| 13216 | Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form [Aristotle] |
| 17994 | The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold [Aristotle] |
| 13224 | There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time [Aristotle] |
| 16594 | The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible [Aristotle] |
| 13223 | Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry [Aristotle] |
| 13220 | Bodies are endlessly divisible [Aristotle] |
| 13210 | Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? [Aristotle] |
| 13211 | If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? [Aristotle] |
| 13228 | There is no time without movement [Aristotle] |
| 2608 | For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer] |
| 22936 | A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
| 4231 | Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe] |
| 8591 | There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart] |
| 22935 | The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
| 7802 | A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle] |
| 4230 | A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe] |
| 15199 | The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
| 16595 | If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? [Aristotle] |
| 13227 | Being is better than not-being [Aristotle] |
| 13226 | An Order controls all things [Aristotle] |