131 ideas
19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
2797 | As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J] |
1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
24047 | An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle] |
1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
24052 | From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle] |
8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
2768 | The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J] |
2765 | Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J] |
2769 | If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J] |
2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J] |
13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
1729 | We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle] |
24057 | What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle] |
2781 | Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J] |
16752 | Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle] |
24058 | The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle] |
24055 | Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle] |
13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
24040 | Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle] |
13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
2745 | A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J] |
2755 | If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J] |
5677 | Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J] |
5678 | Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J] |
5681 | Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J] |
5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG] |
5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J] |
2778 | Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J] |
5684 | Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J] |
2777 | Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J] |
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
5051 | The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle] |
2794 | Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J] |
16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle] |
1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle] |
1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle] |
2780 | Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J] |
17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares] |
1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle] |
1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle] |
1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle] |
1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle] |
5679 | We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J] |
5680 | For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J] |
1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle] |
2782 | We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J] |
2775 | It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J] |
2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
1726 | We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle] |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
2790 | I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J] |
2791 | Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J] |
2788 | If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J] |
2787 | Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J] |
2754 | Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J] |
2749 | For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J] |
2770 | Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J] |
2752 | Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J] |
2771 | Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J] |
2756 | If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J] |
2753 | Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J] |
2773 | Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J] |
2779 | Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J] |
2786 | For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J] |
2767 | If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J] |
2776 | Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J] |
2746 | How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J] |
2747 | Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J] |
2772 | Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J] |
2743 | What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J] |
16647 | Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle] |
24048 | Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle] |
16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
2751 | Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J] |
11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
16646 | To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle] |
1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle] |
5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi] |
24051 | Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle] |
12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle] |
16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle] |
2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J] |
2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J] |
24046 | Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle] |
1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle] |
24053 | If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle] |
1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle] |
1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle] |
24061 | If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle] |
24062 | Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle] |
1710 | Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle] |
24039 | All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle] |
24056 | The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle] |
24050 | If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle] |
24049 | Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle] |
1514 | Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle] |
2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle] |
13275 | The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle] |
1733 | Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle] |
23307 | Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
2744 | Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J] |
2760 | Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J] |
2761 | If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J] |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
2763 | There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J] |
2762 | Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J] |
24060 | Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle] |
6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle] |
11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
1740 | Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle] |
8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
24045 | Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle] |
1738 | Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle] |
24044 | Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle] |
1739 | If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle] |
24064 | If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle] |
24063 | What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle] |
22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |