37 ideas
1708 | In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle] |
1703 | It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle] |
1704 | Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle] |
22272 | Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle] |
9405 | Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle] |
9728 | Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9729 | Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9730 | Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9731 | Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9732 | Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9733 | Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
21593 | In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson] |
1701 | A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle] |
1706 | Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle] |
1707 | Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle] |
23708 | Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG] |
23709 | Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23707 | Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23714 | Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23711 | A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23712 | Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23698 | Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23699 | 'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23700 | A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23701 | A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23702 | A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23703 | Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23704 | We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
23710 | Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
2337 | For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam] |
13763 | Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle] |
1705 | It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle] |
4867 | Whether nature is beautiful or orderly is entirely in relation to human imagination [Spinoza] |
23706 | Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
1702 | Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle] |
4866 | God is a being with infinite attributes, each of them infinite or perfect [Spinoza] |
4868 | Trying to prove God's existence through miracles is proving the obscure by the more obscure [Spinoza] |