445 ideas
| 548 | Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom [Aristotle] |
| 11228 | Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 545 | It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular [Aristotle] |
| 549 | All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas [Aristotle] |
| 1576 | If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive [Aristotle] |
| 609 | Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles [Aristotle] |
| 624 | Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking [Aristotle] |
| 572 | Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry [Aristotle] |
| 22171 | If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance [Aristotle] |
| 11242 | Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes [Aristotle] |
| 12038 | Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know') [Aristotle, by Annas] |
| 559 | Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful [Aristotle] |
| 12997 | Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz] |
| 13009 | A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz] |
| 623 | It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience [Aristotle] |
| 12963 | Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz] |
| 19360 | General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz] |
| 6561 | A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time) [Aristotle] |
| 1601 | The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time [Aristotle] |
| 11282 | Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11281 | We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man [Aristotle] |
| 1602 | For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
| 608 | There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety [Aristotle] |
| 627 | If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites? [Aristotle] |
| 628 | Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter? [Aristotle] |
| 10953 | The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity [Aristotle] |
| 10957 | The material element may be essential to a definition [Aristotle] |
| 10960 | If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity? [Aristotle] |
| 16094 | You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle] |
| 12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
| 12360 | Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 596 | Only substance [ousias] admits of definition [Aristotle] |
| 16107 | Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not [Aristotle] |
| 10944 | A definition must be of something primary [Aristotle] |
| 12982 | One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12976 | If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12984 | Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 12355 | 'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner [Aristotle] |
| 12352 | Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white [Aristotle] |
| 11383 | A definition is of the universal and of the kind [Aristotle] |
| 10961 | Definition by division is into genus and differentiae [Aristotle] |
| 12356 | If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae [Aristotle] |
| 17040 | If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too [Aristotle] |
| 12353 | Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 12081 | Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12980 | Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz] |
| 11153 | A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle] |
| 12080 | Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 15770 | Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given [Aristotle] |
| 574 | Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress [Aristotle] |
| 10913 | Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle] |
| 10914 | Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle] |
| 10916 | Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle] |
| 575 | If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth [Aristotle] |
| 15775 | Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle] |
| 10915 | The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle] |
| 586 | Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle] |
| 19165 | Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Aristotle, by Davidson] |
| 13000 | Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz] |
| 562 | Axioms are the underlying principles of everything, and who but the philosopher can assess their truth? [Aristotle] |
| 573 | The axioms of mathematics are part of philosophy [Aristotle] |
| 12992 | Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz] |
| 10056 | At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz] |
| 22154 | For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Aristotle, by Boulter] |
| 12974 | People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz] |
| 13002 | It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz] |
| 11264 | Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11258 | We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty [Aristotle] |
| 11265 | Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11262 | Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11263 | Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11266 | Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11270 | Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11267 | Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11268 | Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11269 | Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11271 | Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11272 | Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11273 | Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11274 | Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11276 | Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11275 | Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 560 | Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things [Aristotle] |
| 9076 | Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible [Aristotle] |
| 13008 | Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz] |
| 10958 | Perhaps numbers are substances? [Aristotle] |
| 13273 | Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things [Aristotle] |
| 12074 | The one in number just is the particular [Aristotle] |
| 17844 | The unit is stipulated to be indivisible [Aristotle] |
| 17845 | If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle [Aristotle] |
| 17859 | Units came about when the unequals were equalised [Aristotle] |
| 12956 | Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz] |
| 17861 | Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves [Aristotle] |
| 646 | When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers? [Aristotle] |
| 12937 | We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz] |
| 17843 | The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number [Aristotle] |
| 17850 | Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one [Aristotle] |
| 17851 | Number is plurality measured by unity [Aristotle] |
| 9793 | Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion [Aristotle] |
| 13738 | It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort [Aristotle] |
| 12339 | Aristotle removes ontology from mathematics, and replaces the true with the beautiful [Aristotle, by Badiou] |
| 568 | Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances [Aristotle] |
| 12348 | There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 11194 | Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true [Aristotle, by Aquinas] |
| 11288 | Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else [Aristotle] |
| 15776 | There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being [Aristotle] |
| 611 | Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy [Aristotle] |
| 11232 | Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11234 | The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11279 | Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11293 | Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11297 | Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 566 | If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity? [Aristotle] |
| 16090 | Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 570 | Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists' [Aristotle] |
| 12061 | The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent [Aristotle] |
| 10946 | Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality [Aristotle] |
| 16152 | Other types of being all depend on the being of substance [Aristotle] |
| 11295 | There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 13735 | Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions [Aristotle, by Schaffer,J] |
| 12932 | The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz] |
| 16118 | Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things [Aristotle] |
| 15768 | An actuality is usually thought to be a process [Aristotle] |
| 11154 | Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa [Aristotle] |
| 12966 | Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz] |
| 12095 | Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle] |
| 11256 | Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12347 | The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science [Aristotle] |
| 12993 | Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz] |
| 12989 | Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz] |
| 7935 | There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Aristotle, by Macdonald,C] |
| 16161 | Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 15109 | The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 17849 | For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect [Aristotle] |
| 7686 | For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Aristotle, by Jacquette] |
| 10947 | Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal [Aristotle] |
| 10956 | If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle? [Aristotle] |
| 16113 | Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing [Aristotle] |
| 16114 | Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality') [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12959 | We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz] |
| 12967 | I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz] |
| 11387 | The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
| 12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
| 15773 | Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process [Aristotle] |
| 16753 | Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle] |
| 5056 | Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz] |
| 15780 | Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical [Aristotle] |
| 12969 | The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz] |
| 12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
| 11938 | The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it [Aristotle] |
| 15766 | Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things [Aristotle] |
| 15767 | Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! [Aristotle] |
| 11379 | Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared [Aristotle] |
| 12096 | Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 649 | The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals [Aristotle] |
| 12094 | No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle] |
| 10948 | Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior [Aristotle] |
| 633 | If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle] |
| 16110 | If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle] |
| 643 | How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle] |
| 647 | There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle] |
| 9483 | Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy [Aristotle] |
| 640 | All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any [Aristotle] |
| 641 | Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things? [Aristotle] |
| 16108 | If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities [Aristotle] |
| 4470 | Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status [Aristotle, by Moreland] |
| 16145 | Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves [Aristotle] |
| 618 | There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement [Aristotle] |
| 642 | What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities? [Aristotle] |
| 605 | The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement [Aristotle] |
| 645 | If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled [Aristotle] |
| 16158 | Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 16086 | Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities [Aristotle] |
| 12990 | Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz] |
| 12939 | Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz] |
| 10945 | Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle] |
| 11247 | To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation [Aristotle] |
| 12062 | Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
| 12979 | The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz] |
| 12971 | If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz] |
| 13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
| 16160 | For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 13075 | No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz] |
| 16156 | Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle] |
| 12953 | Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz] |
| 590 | Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations [Aristotle] |
| 603 | How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist? [Aristotle] |
| 10949 | Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle] |
| 17838 | Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process [Aristotle] |
| 17841 | The formal cause may be what unifies a substance [Aristotle] |
| 17840 | A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing [Aristotle] |
| 16163 | Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 17860 | Things are unified by contact, mixture and position [Aristotle] |
| 13272 | Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible [Aristotle] |
| 17842 | Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought [Aristotle] |
| 17839 | Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing [Aristotle] |
| 12076 | Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11284 | It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12943 | Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz] |
| 11231 | 'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 592 | The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance [Aristotle] |
| 569 | If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance [Aristotle] |
| 615 | The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance [Aristotle] |
| 599 | We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances [Aristotle] |
| 16778 | Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
| 16084 | Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 600 | Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear [Aristotle] |
| 595 | It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] [Aristotle] |
| 11299 | Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence [Aristotle] |
| 12060 | Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing [Aristotle] |
| 10941 | A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying [Aristotle] |
| 11290 | Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness [Aristotle] |
| 10959 | The substance is the form dwelling in the object [Aristotle] |
| 12093 | Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12362 | A thing's substance is its primary cause of being [Aristotle] |
| 607 | None of the universals can be a substance [Aristotle] |
| 11233 | In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12079 | Substance is distinct being because of its unity [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11855 | Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz] |
| 16096 | Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 10951 | The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney' [Aristotle] |
| 16085 | Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality [Aristotle] |
| 12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
| 12986 | The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz] |
| 12084 | Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 16119 | Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 16148 | Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 16112 | A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12002 | Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 16164 | Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 11251 | Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12345 | In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 16147 | In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 11285 | The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being [Aristotle] |
| 12071 | Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 16095 | Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 15853 | A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle [Aristotle] |
| 16109 | Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form [Aristotle] |
| 16088 | Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12301 | Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form [Aristotle] |
| 16092 | In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12300 | Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K] |
| 12077 | Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12103 | Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 597 | Is there a house over and above its bricks? [Aristotle] |
| 10962 | It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter' [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
| 16142 | A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality [Aristotle] |
| 16103 | A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12968 | A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz] |
| 16575 | Something must pre-exist any new production [Aristotle] |
| 10942 | If you extract all features of the object, what is left over? [Aristotle] |
| 13274 | The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole [Aristotle] |
| 15852 | A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it [Aristotle] |
| 15840 | If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element? [Aristotle] |
| 16136 | A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants [Aristotle] |
| 12878 | Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons] |
| 11199 | Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence [Aristotle, by Aquinas] |
| 12304 | Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge [Aristotle, by Copi] |
| 11294 | Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11298 | Are essences actually universals? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12099 | Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 17846 | The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular [Aristotle] |
| 12311 | Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate [Aristotle] |
| 12069 | Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12070 | Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12088 | Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11998 | Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 12083 | Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11382 | Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 16097 | To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12931 | Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz] |
| 12811 | We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz] |
| 12091 | If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12981 | Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz] |
| 11292 | Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle] |
| 10963 | A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
| 11287 | Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11188 | The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11291 | A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature [Aristotle] |
| 12098 | An essence causes both its own unity and its kind [Aristotle] |
| 10964 | Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
| 15107 | Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 11244 | Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 5057 | If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz] |
| 16143 | It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality [Aristotle] |
| 16106 | Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle] |
| 16144 | Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle] |
| 12359 | 'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 12068 | Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 16141 | In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 12987 | For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz] |
| 16508 | Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force [Aristotle] |
| 16117 | The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12884 | The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz] |
| 12975 | We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz] |
| 12805 | If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz] |
| 12806 | Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 12092 | Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12090 | Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 16159 | For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 12972 | Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz] |
| 11378 | How a thing is generated does not explain its essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12101 | Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11380 | Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle] |
| 17848 | Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same [Aristotle] |
| 16134 | We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object [Aristotle] |
| 17847 | You are one with yourself in form and matter [Aristotle] |
| 5055 | No two things are totally identical [Leibniz] |
| 12611 | Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle] |
| 17852 | A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction [Aristotle] |
| 15769 | Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle] |
| 15779 | Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle] |
| 15777 | A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing [Aristotle] |
| 14544 | Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances [Aristotle] |
| 15774 | We recognise potentiality from actuality [Aristotle] |
| 15778 | Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them [Aristotle] |
| 12978 | A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz] |
| 12612 | Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle] |
| 15108 | Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 17079 | Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz] |
| 547 | The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge [Aristotle] |
| 12960 | We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz] |
| 12998 | Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz] |
| 10950 | Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind [Aristotle] |
| 544 | Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals [Aristotle] |
| 546 | It takes skill to know causes, not experience [Aristotle] |
| 13006 | Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz] |
| 12996 | I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz] |
| 13003 | The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz] |
| 21253 | Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz] |
| 12933 | Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz] |
| 12991 | Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12929 | All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz] |
| 12940 | What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz] |
| 19358 | Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz] |
| 12948 | A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz] |
| 13005 | Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz] |
| 4302 | You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz] |
| 12947 | We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz] |
| 12930 | The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz] |
| 543 | All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses [Aristotle] |
| 13001 | Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz] |
| 583 | The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle] |
| 12949 | Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz] |
| 581 | Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle] |
| 584 | If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle] |
| 585 | If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle] |
| 576 | If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle] |
| 12309 | There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle] |
| 11386 | Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type [Aristotle] |
| 5053 | The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz] |
| 11385 | Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle] |
| 11289 | Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible [Aristotle] |
| 11246 | Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11384 | We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location [Aristotle] |
| 16135 | Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences [Aristotle] |
| 16105 | We know a thing when we grasp its essence [Aristotle] |
| 11296 | The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance [Aristotle] |
| 11999 | Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 12977 | We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz] |
| 5054 | Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz] |
| 12944 | It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz] |
| 9088 | Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things [Aristotle] |
| 16153 | Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 12951 | Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz] |
| 9791 | Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement [Aristotle] |
| 19364 | Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz] |
| 571 | Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated? [Aristotle] |
| 12942 | Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz] |
| 12973 | We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz] |
| 19368 | The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz] |
| 12935 | Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz] |
| 23311 | Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 23310 | Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle] |
| 11245 | Many memories make up a single experience [Aristotle] |
| 12938 | An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz] |
| 12950 | We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz] |
| 12945 | Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz] |
| 19357 | The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz] |
| 12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
| 12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
| 10954 | It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men [Aristotle] |
| 9792 | Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things [Aristotle] |
| 9077 | Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation [Aristotle] |
| 9075 | If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness [Aristotle] |
| 12946 | The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz] |
| 12964 | If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz] |
| 636 | Beauty involves the Forms of order, symmetry and limit, which can be handled mathematically [Aristotle] |
| 635 | The good is found in actions, but beauty can exist without movement [Aristotle] |
| 15772 | A thing's active function is its end [Aristotle] |
| 12958 | Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz] |
| 629 | Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? [Aristotle] |
| 12957 | The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz] |
| 12962 | Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz] |
| 12934 | We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz] |
| 591 | Excellence is a sort of completion [Aristotle] |
| 625 | Is excellence separate from things, or part of them, or both? [Aristotle] |
| 621 | Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence [Aristotle] |
| 3236 | Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society [Williams,B] |
| 3234 | Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view [Williams,B] |
| 3233 | Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs [Williams,B] |
| 3235 | It is a mark of extreme exploitation that the sufferers do not realise their plight [Williams,B] |
| 12936 | There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz] |
| 11241 | Wise men aren't instructed; they instruct [Aristotle] |
| 632 | Why are some things destructible and others not? [Aristotle] |
| 626 | Everything is arranged around a single purpose [Aristotle] |
| 17858 | Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers [Aristotle] |
| 12299 | Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter [Aristotle, by Fine,K] |
| 601 | Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites [Aristotle] |
| 10955 | Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects) [Aristotle] |
| 16590 | Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category [Aristotle] |
| 12001 | Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 12868 | Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties [Simons on Aristotle] |
| 15954 | Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable [Aristotle, by Alexander,P] |
| 16099 | The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 15771 | Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity [Aristotle] |
| 616 | It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity? [Aristotle] |
| 16098 | I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 10952 | Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds [Aristotle] |
| 561 | Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many? [Aristotle] |
| 588 | We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise [Aristotle] |
| 634 | Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement [Aristotle] |
| 14543 | When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows [Aristotle] |
| 11856 | Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz] |
| 12994 | Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz] |
| 12808 | Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz] |
| 12985 | Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz] |
| 12952 | Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz] |
| 12955 | If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz] |
| 617 | It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed [Aristotle] |
| 620 | The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good [Aristotle] |
| 619 | Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover [Aristotle] |
| 613 | Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes [Aristotle] |
| 12954 | God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz] |
| 622 | There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude [Aristotle] |
| 12988 | The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz] |
| 1414 | A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz] |
| 21252 | Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz] |
| 7603 | God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe [Aristotle, by Armstrong,K] |
| 16165 | For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 19328 | Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
| 610 | The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate [Aristotle] |
| 12097 | There are as many eternal unmovable substances as there are movements of the stars [Aristotle] |
| 5058 | Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz] |