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All the ideas for 'works', 'Necessary Beings' and 'On Sense and Reference'

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81 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale]
With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard]
A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury]
People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer]
It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege]
In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette]
Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale]
'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale]
Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale]
Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale]
Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale]
If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter]
The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K]
Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege]
Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege]
Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege]
In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege]
We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett]
Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege]
Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus]