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All the ideas for 'Topics', 'Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy' and 'New work for a theory of universals'

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70 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
The Dao (Way) first means the road, and comes to mean the right way to live [Norden]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
The hermeneutic circle is either within the text, or between text and biased reader [Norden]
Heremeneutics is either 'faith' (examining truth) or 'suspicion' (looking for hidden motives) [Norden]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle]
Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle]
The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle]
In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle]
The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle]
Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle]
'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle]
Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver]
Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley]
Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis]
Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis]
Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis]
For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis]
All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis]
Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil]
Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis]
We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis]
Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle]
Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle]
Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis]
We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle]
Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis]
Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis]
Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle]