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All the ideas for 'Topics', 'That Politics may be reduced to a Science' and 'Philosophical Investigations'

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90 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle]
Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle]
We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle]
The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle]
The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle]
Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle]
'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle]
Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle]
Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein]
To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein]
If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 10. Rule Following
Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein]
One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein]
If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein]
An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein]
Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke]
Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein]
Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands]
We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein]
In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein]
Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein]
Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein]
If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein]
We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein]
If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein]
If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton]
Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein]
To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 3. Actions and Events
What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm? [Wittgenstein]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle]
Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle]
Friendship without community spirit misses out on the main part of virtue [Hume]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
It would be absurd if even a free constitution did not impose restraints, for the public good [Hume]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Nobility either share in the power of the whole, or they compose the power of the whole [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / b. Religious Meaning
Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The human body is the best picture of the human soul [Wittgenstein]