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All the ideas for 'Topics', 'Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals' and 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671'

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100 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau]
Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / b. Early medieval philosophy
The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau]
Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / c. Later medieval philosophy
Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau]
In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / d. Renaissance philosophy
Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau]
Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau]
After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau]
The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle]
Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle]
We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle]
The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle]
The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle]
Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle]
'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle]
17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau]
Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau]
Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau]
Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau]
If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau]
Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau]
Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau]
There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau]
If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau]
A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle]
Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle]
Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
The human heart has a natural concern for public good [Hume]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Personal Merit is the possession of useful or agreeable mental qualities [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle]
Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice only exists to support society [Hume]
If we all naturally had everything we could ever desire, the virtue of justice would be irrelevant [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Moral philosophy aims to show us our duty [Hume]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act [Hume]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Virtue just requires careful calculation and a preference for the greater happiness [Hume]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
No one would cause pain to a complete stranger who happened to be passing [Hume]
Nature makes private affections come first, because public concerns are spread too thinly [Hume]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The safety of the people is the supreme law [Hume]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
Society prefers helpful lies to harmful truth [Hume]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
If you equalise possessions, people's talents will make them unequal again [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau]
If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / b. Transubstantiation
Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau]