209 ideas
| 19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb] |
| 2136 | Philosophers become as divine and orderly as possible, by studying divinity and order [Plato] |
| 16281 | Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis] |
| 23767 | The winds of the discussion should decide its destination [Plato] |
| 16288 | Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge) [Lewis] |
| 23682 | It would be absurd to be precise about the small things, but only vague about the big things [Plato] |
| 1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
| 1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
| 2151 | Dialectic is the only method of inquiry which uproots the things which it takes for granted [Plato] |
| 2154 | The ability to take an overview is the distinguishing mark of a dialectician [Plato] |
| 4011 | For Plato, rationality is a vision of and love of a cosmic rational order [Plato, by Taylor,C] |
| 2093 | You must never go against what you actually believe [Plato] |
| 2130 | People often merely practice eristic instead of dialectic, because they don't analyse the subject-matter [Plato] |
| 8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine] |
| 4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
| 9651 | Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact [Lewis] |
| 2145 | In mathematics certain things have to be accepted without further explanation [Plato] |
| 13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady] |
| 15731 | Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis] |
| 8726 | Geometry can lead the mind upwards to truth and philosophy [Plato] |
| 9863 | We aim for elevated discussion of pure numbers, not attaching them to physical objects [Plato] |
| 9864 | In pure numbers, all ones are equal, with no internal parts [Plato] |
| 8727 | Geometry is not an activity, but the study of unchanging knowledge [Plato] |
| 9861 | The same thing is both one and an unlimited number at the same time [Plato] |
| 10470 | There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver] |
| 9862 | To become rational, philosophers must rise from becoming into being [Plato] |
| 21818 | Being depends on the Good, which is not itself being, but superior to being [Plato] |
| 2061 | The best things (gods, healthy bodies, good souls) are least liable to change [Plato] |
| 9650 | Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion [Lewis] |
| 6562 | Plato's reality has unchanging Parmenidean forms, and Heraclitean flux [Plato, by Fogelin] |
| 8909 | Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis] |
| 9057 | Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis] |
| 9671 | Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis] |
| 15751 | Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis] |
| 15735 | Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis] |
| 9656 | The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis] |
| 15737 | To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis] |
| 15742 | A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis] |
| 15397 | If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
| 15398 | Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
| 15741 | All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis] |
| 15752 | We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis] |
| 14996 | Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis] |
| 15744 | We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis] |
| 15743 | Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis] |
| 15740 | I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis] |
| 16262 | Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin] |
| 15739 | There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis] |
| 10723 | A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver] |
| 15399 | The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron] |
| 15732 | Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis] |
| 15733 | Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis] |
| 15734 | If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis] |
| 9655 | Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis] |
| 16290 | I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis] |
| 9653 | It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis] |
| 9657 | You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis] |
| 15750 | Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis] |
| 15749 | Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis] |
| 15748 | Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis] |
| 15745 | Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis] |
| 15746 | If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis] |
| 2142 | The plurality of beautiful things must belong to a single class, because they have a single particular character [Plato] |
| 15747 | Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis] |
| 12043 | Forms are not universals, as they don't cover every general term [Plato, by Annas] |
| 5094 | Plato's Forms are said to have no location in space [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| 2159 | Craftsmen making furniture refer to the form, but no one manufactures the form of furniture [Plato] |
| 17 | A Form applies to a set of particular things with the same name [Plato] |
| 12122 | Plato mistakenly thought forms were totally abstracted away from matter [Bacon on Plato] |
| 5574 | Plato's Forms not only do not come from the senses, but they are beyond possibility of sensing [Plato, by Kant] |
| 13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 9667 | Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis] |
| 13268 | There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider] |
| 13793 | An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder] |
| 9663 | A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis] |
| 14737 | Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
| 9664 | Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis] |
| 9665 | There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis] |
| 19280 | I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis] |
| 15968 | Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis] |
| 15969 | Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis] |
| 9660 | The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis] |
| 9669 | There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis] |
| 16133 | Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis] |
| 16132 | On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis] |
| 16283 | For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis] |
| 12255 | For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis] |
| 9219 | Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider] |
| 15022 | If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis] |
| 10469 | A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis] |
| 16441 | Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
| 16282 | Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis] |
| 16284 | Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis] |
| 16286 | Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis] |
| 16287 | Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis] |
| 9662 | Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis] |
| 7690 | If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis] |
| 14404 | The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks] |
| 5440 | A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner] |
| 5441 | Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis] |
| 16291 | In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis] |
| 11903 | Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P] |
| 15129 | Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis] |
| 9670 | Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis] |
| 2133 | Knowledge must be of the permanent unchanging nature of things [Plato] |
| 5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
| 11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 2162 | If theory and practice conflict, the best part of the mind accepts theory, so the other part is of lower grade [Plato] |
| 16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 2140 | True belief without knowledge is like blind people on the right road [Plato] |
| 16279 | General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis] |
| 16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
| 9661 | Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed [Lewis] |
| 9652 | To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis] |
| 11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
| 9658 | An explanation tells us how an event was caused [Lewis] |
| 16280 | Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories [Lewis] |
| 12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 16274 | If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising [Lewis] |
| 2096 | Is the function of the mind management, authority and planning - or is it one's whole way of life? [Plato] |
| 6009 | Psychic conflict is clear if appetite is close to the body and reason fairly separate [Plato, by Modrak] |
| 6041 | There is a third element to the mind - spirit - lying between reason and appetite [Plato] |
| 2127 | The mind has parts, because we have inner conflicts [Plato] |
| 1737 | The soul seems to have an infinity of parts [Aristotle on Plato] |
| 23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
| 8901 | Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively [Lewis] |
| 8904 | The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction [Lewis] |
| 8938 | The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers? [Lewis] |
| 8903 | Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets [Lewis] |
| 8902 | If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations [Lewis] |
| 8905 | If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts [Lewis] |
| 8906 | If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes [Lewis] |
| 8907 | The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it [Lewis] |
| 8908 | For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction [Lewis] |
| 16289 | We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist [Lewis] |
| 16278 | A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis] |
| 9654 | A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis] |
| 15736 | A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis] |
| 15738 | Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis] |
| 11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 5945 | The 'Republic' is a great work of rhetorical theory [Lawson-Tancred on Plato] |
| 23316 | For Plato and Aristotle there is no will; there is only rational desire for what is seen as good [Plato, by Frede,M] |
| 16 | We avoid evil either through a natural aversion, or because we have acquired knowledge [Plato] |
| 16565 | Without the surface decoration, poetry shows only appearances and nothing of what is real [Plato] |
| 2160 | Representation is two steps removed from the truth [Plato] |
| 2163 | Artists should be excluded from a law-abiding community, because they destroy the rational mind [Plato] |
| 2135 | Truth is closely related to proportion [Plato] |
| 2141 | I suggest that we forget about trying to define goodness itself for the time being [Plato] |
| 1869 | The good cannot be expressed in words, but imprints itself upon the soul [Plato, by Celsus] |
| 6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
| 4115 | Plato found that he could only enforce rational moral justification by creating an authoritarian society [Williams,B on Plato] |
| 4547 | Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value [Nietzsche on Plato] |
| 2094 | A thing's function is what it alone can do, or what it does better than other things [Plato] |
| 2095 | If something has a function then it has a state of being good [Plato] |
| 2129 | Goodness is mental health, badness is mental sickness [Plato] |
| 12 | If we were invisible, would the just man become like the unjust? [Plato] |
| 2168 | Clever criminals do well at first, but not in the long run [Plato] |
| 2137 | The main aim is to understand goodness, which gives everything its value and advantage [Plato] |
| 2139 | Every person, and every activity, aims at the good [Plato] |
| 2143 | Good has the same role in the world of knowledge as the sun has in the physical world [Plato] |
| 2147 | The sight of goodness leads to all that is fine and true and right [Plato] |
| 4007 | For Plato we abandon honour and pleasure once we see the Good [Plato, by Taylor,C] |
| 2144 | Goodness makes truth and knowledge possible [Plato] |
| 2164 | Bad is always destructive, where good preserves and benefits [Plato] |
| 2138 | Pleasure is commonly thought to be the good, though the more ingenious prefer knowledge [Plato] |
| 2070 | Even people who think pleasure is the good admit that there are bad pleasures [Plato] |
| 2157 | Nice smells are intensive, have no preceding pain, and no bad after-effect [Plato] |
| 2134 | Philosophers are concerned with totally non-physical pleasures [Plato] |
| 2156 | There are three types of pleasure, for reason, for spirit and for appetite [Plato] |
| 2158 | Pleasure-seekers desperately seek illusory satisfaction, like filling a leaky vessel [Plato] |
| 2123 | Excessive pleasure deranges people, making the other virtues impossible [Plato] |
| 2166 | We should behave well even if invisible, for the health of the mind [Plato] |
| 2097 | Isn't it better to have a reputation for goodness than to actually be good? [Plato] |
| 19946 | Morality is a compromise, showing restraint, to avoid suffering wrong without compensation [Plato] |
| 5 | Justice is merely the interests of the stronger party [Plato] |
| 7 | Surely you don't return a borrowed weapon to a mad friend? [Plato] |
| 8 | Is right just the interests of the powerful? [Plato] |
| 15 | Sin first, then sacrifice to the gods from the proceeds [Plato] |
| 5944 | For Plato, virtue is its own reward [Lawson-Tancred on Plato] |
| 2155 | True goodness requires mental unity and harmony [Plato] |
| 2126 | A good community necessarily has wisdom, courage, self-discipline and morality [Plato] |
| 23562 | If the parts of our soul do their correct work, we will be just people, and will act justly [Plato] |
| 2092 | Simonides said morality is helping one's friends and harming one's enemies [Plato] |
| 19889 | People need society because the individual has too many needs [Plato] |
| 19890 | All exchanges in a community are for mutual benefit [Plato] |
| 10 | After a taste of mutual harm, men make a legal contract to avoid it [Plato] |
| 23561 | People doing their jobs properly is the fourth cardinal virtue for a city [Plato] |
| 2149 | Reluctant rulers make a better and more unified administration [Plato] |
| 2132 | Only rule by philosophers of integrity can keep a community healthy [Plato] |
| 2131 | Is there anything better for a community than to produce excellent people? [Plato] |
| 11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle] |
| 2148 | To gain knowledge, turn away from the world of change, and focus on true goodness [Plato] |
| 3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 2152 | Dialectic is the highest and most important part of the curriculum [Plato] |
| 2153 | Compulsory intellectual work never remains in the mind [Plato] |
| 8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend] |
| 12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
| 9659 | Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis] |
| 9666 | It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything [Lewis] |
| 2630 | If Plato's God is immaterial, he will lack consciousness, wisdom, pleasure and movement, which are essential to him [Cicero on Plato] |
| 14 | If the gods are non-existent or indifferent, why bother to deceive them? [Plato] |
| 22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| 2165 | Something is unlikely to be immortal if it is imperfectly made from diverse parts [Plato] |
| 13 | Is the supreme reward for virtue to be drunk for eternity? [Plato] |
| 2120 | God is responsible for the good things, but we must look elsewhere for the cause of the bad things [Plato] |